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A CHANGING EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARD? THE
SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF A
HEIGHTENED RATIONAL BASIS TEST
IN CITY OF CLEBURNE v.
CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER
I. INTRODUCTION
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides
that "[n]o state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."' Courts have interpreted the clause to be
an expression of the goal that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.2 However, the difficulty for courts has been to develop cri-
teria for determining which persons are "similarly" situated and how to
treat them "alike" under the law. Some inequality is inevitable in all
laws because they draw distinctions which create special burdens on dif-
ferent groups of people.3 Furthermore, in the interest of public policy,
legislatures must retain the ability to create such distinctions.4 Thus,
courts have struggled to find a workable standard by which necessary
legislation may be passed without conflicting with the goal of equal pro-
tection of the laws.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,5 the United States
Supreme Court was again faced with this challenge. There, the Court
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
2. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (held unconstitutional a
statute which taxed domestic corporations doing business within and without the state but
exempted from taxation those corporations doing business solely outside the state), overruled,
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); see also Tussman & ten-
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. Rlv. 341 (1949). "The Constitution
does not require that things different in fact be treated in law as if they were the same. But it
does require, in its concern for equality, that those who are similarly situated be similarly
treated with respect to the purpose of the law." Id. at 344.
3. This proposition was recognized by Justice Brewer in Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Mat-
thews where, in his discussion of the issues of equality and constitutionality, he commented,
"the very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the fact
of inequality [alone] in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality." 174 U.S. 96,
106 (1899).
4. The fact that such classifications are a necessary part of legislation was also recognized
by Justice Frankfurter in Tigner v. Texas: "[L]aws are not abstract propositions. They do not
relate to abstract units A, B and C, but are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficul-
ties, addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies." 310 U.S. 141,
147 (1940).
5. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
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was asked to determine the proper standard of judicial review mandated
under the equal protection clause for legislation affecting mentally re-
tarded persons. The Court determined that the mentally retarded are not
a quasi-suspect class6 and that legislation affecting this group is subject
only to minimal scrutiny.7 This Note will examine these conclusions in
light of the history of the application of the equal protection clause and
will discuss the ramifications of the Court's ruling.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Because federal judicial intervention into the state legislative process
was disfavored, early cases interpreted the equal protection clause nar-
rowly. The prevailing view was that the fourteenth amendment had been
"primarily designed" to protect blacks from laws which discriminated
against them on the basis of color.8 In Strauder v. West Virginia,9 one of
the first cases in which the Court struck down a state law on equal pro-
tection grounds, it was held that a statute which restricted jury service to
white males over twenty-one years of age denied a black male criminal
defendant "equal legal protection."" ° However, the Court showed little
willingness to expand its power under the equal protection clause into
other areas of state legislation. In the Slaughter-House Cases,"1 the
Court noted its disapproval of such expansion by implying it was un-
likely that the equal protection clause would ever be applied to any situa-
tion other than action by a state which discriminated against blacks as a
group. 12
By 1885, however, there was some indication that the equal protec-
tion clause might be applied to legislation affecting other areas such as
social and economic regulations. In Barbier v. Connolly,1 3 the Court up-
held a state law limiting the hours during which laundries could operate,
6. Id. at 3255-56. For a discussion of quasi-suspect classification, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 62-67.
7. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258. For a discussion of minimal scrutiny, better known as
the rational basis test, see infra text accompanying notes 29-37.
8. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), overruled, Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975).
9. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
10. Id. at 309.
11. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
12. Id. at 81. The Court disfavored federal intervention into the state's legislative process,
concluding that such intervention "would constitute [the] [C]ourt a perpetual censor upon all
legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such
as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption
of this amendment." Id. at 78.
13. 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
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concluding that such legislation fell within the states' police power to
regulate health and safety. 4 Yet, the Court made it clear that these pow-
ers were still subject to the limitations of the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.15 The implication was that
state legislative power was not unlimited.
A. The Doctrine of Reasonable Classification
The idea that the equal protection clause could have far broader
application than that articulated in the Slaughter-House Cases16 and
Strauder v. West Virginia1 7 and could limit the police powers of the
states created a paradox for the Court. It was soon recognized that a
balance must be struck between the necessity of legislative classifications
which furthered legitimate state goals, and the requirement that these
classifications not deny equal protection of the laws. Thus, a judicial
view developed that permitted classifications which furthered a reason-
able public purpose, but allowed the Court to strike down those classifi-
cations which were unreasonable or arbitrary. 8 This "doctrine of
reasonable classification" allowed for broad enforcement of the equal
protection clause while recognizing the states' right to legislate in their
sovereign capacity.
The doctrine of reasonable classification 9 became the standard by
14. Id. at 31.
15. Id. at 32.
16. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). See supra text accompanying note 11.
17. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
18. An early example of this view can be seen in Justice Brewer's opinion in Gulf, C. and
S.F.R.R. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). In that case, the Court held unconstitutional a state
statute which imposed attorneys' fees upon railway corporations but not upon any other cor-
porations. Although Justice Brewer confirmed that it was not within the scope of the four-
teenth amendment that powers of classification be withheld from the states, he stated that such
classifications could not be made arbitrarily. Id. at 159.
19. In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., the Court expressed the doctrine of reason-
able classification as follows:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
State the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of
a wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is
without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification
having some reasonable basis does not offend that clause merely because it is not
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts
at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classifica-
tion in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). See supra note 18 for a related discussion of Gulf, C. and S.F.R.R.
v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). For a general discussion of reasonable classification, see Tussman
& tenBroek, supra note 2.
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which the Court scrutinized state legislative classifications during the
early twentieth century. This doctrine expressed the view that although
legislative classifications inevitably create some inequality, such classifi-
cations are necessary to further the states' police powers.2° Therefore,
these classifications were considered offensive to the fourteenth amend-
ment only when they were found to be arbitrary or unreasonable.21
Laissezfaire was the favored economic view in the early part of the
twentieth century.22 Thus, state regulation of business was disfavored
and often viewed as "unreasonable" or "arbitrary" by the Court. Conse-
quently, state laws regulating prices or taxation were frequently invali-
dated on equal protection grounds because the Court did not view such
legislation as "reasonable. ' 23 During this time,24 the doctrine of reason-
able classification granted the judiciary broad power to question the wis-
dom of legislative actions. However, the idea that the Court could
impose its own economic values upon the legislature soon came to be
disfavored.2"
20. Lindsley, 38 U.S. at 78-79. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22. The term laissezfaire is derived from the French verbs laisser (to let) and faire (to do).
It loosely means "let people do as they think best." Laissez faire expresses "the principal that
government should not interfere with individuals," especially in the areas of industry and
trade. THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1561 (12th ed. 1976).
For a general discussion of laissezfaire theory with respect to Supreme Court decisions, see B.
TwIss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTrrUTION-How LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE SUPREME
COURT (1962).
23. State laws regulating taxation and prices were the most frequently invalidated. See
Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936) (held unconstitutional statute al-
lowing dealers in business prior to arbitrarily chosen date to sell milk at lower prices than
other dealers); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920) (held exemption from
income tax in violation of equal protection clause where exemption allowed for domestic cor-
poration doing business both outside and within state but not allowed for domestic corporation
doing business solely outside state); Southern R.R. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910) (held un-
constitutional statute imposing special franchise tax on foreign corporation but not on domes-
tic corporation carrying on similar business), overruled, United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
24. This period is often referred to as the "Lochner-era." The term refers to Lochner V.
New York, where the Court invalidated, under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, a statute which limited working hours of bakers. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner is repre-
sentative of what is termed "substantive due process," a practice whereby the Court relies on
the due process clause to invalidate substantive state regulation of personal liberties. For a
general discussion of substantive due process, see Hetherington, State Economic Regulation
and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 13 (1958). During the "Lochner-era,"
much economic regulation was struck down merely because the Court deemed such regulation
unwise. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. The same results occurred under the com-
merce clause at this time. See, eg., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (child labor
law held unconstitutional), overruled, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
25. Justice Holmes was an early critic of the Court's action. He argued in Lochner that
the Court should not impose its own economic values on the legislature because the
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The year 1937 marked a change in the Court's attitude toward the
ability of the states to exercise their police powers.26 Greater deference
was given to the states, thus permitting legislatures to pass laws with
little interference from the judiciary. A "reasonable classification," for-
merly viewed as one that was reasonable from the subjective view of
those sitting on the federal bench, now came to be viewed as one which
had some "rational basis" in the states' powers.2 7 Under this new "ra-
tional basis" test, state legislation was presumed valid until shown other-
wise by a challenging party.28 This rational basis test afforded states
wide latitude to legislate in the areas of social and economic regulation.
One of the most frequently noted cases demonstrating the Court's
new-found deference to state legislatures is Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co.2 9 Williamson involved an Oklahoma law prohibiting opticians from
fitting or duplicating lenses in eye glasses without a prescription from an
opthalmologist or optometrist, but exempted sellers of ready-to-wear
eyewear from this requirement.3" The Court concluded that as long as
the legislature may have had a legitimate purpose31 and might have
thought that the regulation was a rational means of furthering that pur-
pose, judicial intervention was improper.3 2 Thus, with Williamson, the
Court adopted an extremely lenient rational basis test. All that was re-
quired for state legislation to pass constitutional muster was: (1) that
there exist a conceivably legitimate purpose that the state sought to
"[C]onstitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory." Lochner, 198 U.S.
at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). For examples of cases upholding economic regulation, see
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upheld statute fixing prices for sale of milk) and
Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upheld statute providing maximum 10-hour day for
factory workers).
26. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upheld minimum wage
law and rebutted liberty of contract argument followed in Lochner).
27. The Court applied the rational basis test in cases involving substantive due process and
equal protection issues, expressing its policy as follows: "Mhe existence of facts supporting
the legislative judgment is to be presumed... [and] regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions ... [will not] be pronounced unconstitutional unless ... facts...
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and expe-
rience of the legislators." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
Carolene upheld a federal regulation which prohibited, for health purposes, the sale of a milk
substitute. For further discussion of Carolene, see infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
28. Carolene, 304 U.S. at 153-54.
29. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
30. Id. at 486.
31. No particular purpose for the legislation was indicated. The Court speculated that the
legislature might have concluded it was necessary to guarantee regular eye examinations and
safe lenses or that advertising should be limited. Id. at 487-89 & n.2.
32. Id. at 488. "[T]he law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims [to
be] constitutional." Id. at 487-89, 488 n.2.
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achieve; and (2) that a legislature could rationally believe that the law
could further that purpose.33
The Court has defended the rational basis test as not being "tooth-
less."'34 However, the minimal scrutiny given to legislation under this
test has also been criticized as being "none in fact."'35 As will be dis-
cussed later in this Note, the test has often been manipulated by the
Court and may, in some circumstances, be applied in a slightly more
"strict" form. However, in its most lenient form,36 the test allows any
conceivable basis for a law and is not concerned with whether the alleged
purpose is actually furthered, only with whether the legislature could
reasonably have believed it would be furthered by the law.37 Therefore,
the test has generally proved inadequate outside the areas of social and
economic regulations.
B. Strict Scrutiny and Suspect Classifications
As early as 1896, Justice Harlan expressed his belief that color is
"constitutionally irrelevant" and that governments may not legitimately
discriminate on the basis of race.38 In 1937, Justice Stone, in United
States v. Carolene Products,3 9 further articulated the need for a more
searching judicial inquiry where legislation affects "discrete and insular"
minorities who, because of a history of prejudice or bias, may not depend
33. Even if a completely different purpose is achieved, under the rational basis test, the law
will be upheld if it might achieve the purported goal. Professor Tribe has argued that this
rational basis test is often really a "conceivable basis test." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 996 (1978). In deference to state objectives in economic regulation, the Court's
determinations may be based on a state of facts which "(1) actually exists, (2) would convinc-
ingly justify the classification if it did exist, or (3) has ever been urged in the classification's
defense by those who either promulgated it or have argued in its support." Id.
34. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) (upheld provision of Social Security
Act concerning survivors benefits which denied presumption of dependency to certain classes
of illegitimate children).
35. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
36. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (held valid statute
banning sale of milk in plastic non-returnable containers but allowing sale in other types of
non-returnable containers); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980)
(held valid statute withholding retirement benefits from some railroad workers but not others);
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (held valid provision allowing vendors in
business as of certain date to remain in business but denying same opportunity to others). But
see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14
(1985). Ward and Williams are discussed infra at text accompanying notes 277-95.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
38. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554-55 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (upheld "sepa-
rate but equal" seating on railway), overruled, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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on "those political processes ordinarily... relied upon to protect minori-
ties."'  The Carolene dicta conceded that a rational basis test was suffi-
cient where normal political processes may be expected to correct unwise
legislative decisions. However, Justice Stone recognized that legislation
which discriminates against certain groups may be "suspect" due to such
factors as: (1) a history of traditional bias or prejudice against the group;
(2) a tradition of restricted access of the group to the polls and the polit-
ical process; (3) the likelihood of a lack of empathy toward the group by
the enacting legislature; and (4) the immutability of the characteristic
which distinguishes the group from society at large.41 Where these fac-
tors are present, it is more likely that legislation burdening a "discrete
and insular" minority may not be corrected through traditional legisla-
tive channels. Thus, the Court has demanded that classifications drawn
on the basis of such "suspect" criteria have a close relationship between
the purpose of the legislation and the means chosen: the standard is one
which requires the classification to have a compelling relation to a sub-
stantial government purpose.42 Furthermore, where suspect classifica-
tions are involved, the burden of proving that this standard has been met
is on the state rather than the party challenging the law.43 Because this
standard is so difficult to satisfy, this level of scrutiny has generally been
termed "strict" scrutiny.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has designated few classifications as
suspect and subject to strict scrutiny.44  Because states can seldom
demonstrate that classifying on the basis of race serves any state interest,
strict scrutiny has been used to invalidate many racially discriminatory
laws.45 Even where racial groups are not discrete and insular "minori-
40. Id. at 152 n.4.
41. For a general discussion of these factors, see L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 1000-03; see
also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT 145-70 (1980); P. POLYVIOU, THE EQUAL PROTEC-
TION OF THE LAWS 23845 (1980).
42. See infra note 43. See generally Note, Equal Protection: A Closer Look at Closer Scru-
tiny, 76 MICH. L. REv. 771 (1978).
43. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 1003. The burden of proof in such cases rests upon the
state to demonstrate: (1) that there is a substantial government purpose; and (2) that there is
an extremely tight relationship between the purpose and the means chosen. Where strict scru-
tiny is applied, the Court will not recognize speculative purposes for legislation as it has done
under the rational basis test. Id. In addition, such interests as efficiency, convenience or cost-
saving, though sufficient to justify legislation under a rational basis test, are .insufficient to
justify legislation subject to a strict scrutiny analysis. Id.
44. For an arugment that mentally disabled persons should be granted suspect status, see
Ryers, The Suspect Context: A New Suspect Classification Doctrine for the Mentally Handi-
capped, 26 ARIZ. L. REv. 205 (1984); see also Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal
Treatment: The Qualification of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 855 (1975).
45. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (held invalid state statute disenfranchising
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ties" in the Carolene tradition,46 the Court has seen fit to continue using
strict scrutiny because of other factors such as a long history of racial
prejudice and political powerlessness.47 For instance, the Court has held
that laws which classify on the basis of national origin are also subject to
strict scrutiny.48 Such classifications, like those based on race, suggest a
likelihood of ethnic prejudice. In addition, national origin, like race, is a
characteristic over which an individual has no control.
State legislation classifying on the basis of alienage has also tradi-
tionally been subjected to strict scrutiny.49 Because aliens are unable to
vote and there is a likelihood that laws burdening aliens stem from irra-
tional bias or animosity toward "foreigners," laws classifying on this ba-
sis are suspect. Thus, in In re Griffiths,5" the Court invalidated a statute
preventing resident aliens from practicing law because the state failed to
demonstrate there was a "compelling state interest" that the law was
"closely tailored" to further."1 In many cases, alienage classifications are
still subject to strict scrutiny.12 However, recent developments indicate a
trend toward more deference to the states in this area, particularly where
a political rather than economic purpose is served by the law in
question.53
Another area where the Court has applied strict scrutiny is where a
law substantially impinges on "fundamental" rights. The Court has rec-
criminals convicted of acts of moral turpitude on basis that original purpose of law was racially
discriminatory); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (overturned ruling granting custody to
father of white child because mother remarried to black man); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (held invalid statute prohibiting marriage between blacks and whites); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (held unconstitutional "separate but equal" policy in public
education) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
47. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (held prima facie case of discrimination
against Mexican-Americans in selection of grand jurors existed in spite of fact that they were a
"growing [ethnic] majority" in county).
48. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (held discrimination against Mexican-Ameri-
cans with respect to jury service subject to same scrutiny as discrimination against blacks
where prejudice is result of community prejudice).
49. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (held invalid statute preventing resident aliens
from practicing law); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (held invalid state law barring
aliens from civil service); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (held invalid statute
denying welfare benefits to aliens).
50. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
51. Id. at 724-27.
52. See supra note 49.
53. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (held state has wider discretion in
restricting aliens where political rather than economic purpose is served); Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68 (1979) (held state may bar aliens from becoming public school teachers); Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (held state may prevent aliens from becoming state troopers
because they execute "broad public policy").
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ognized that certain basic human rights are either explicitly or implicitly
protected by the Constitution and, therefore, any serious legislative im-
pingement of these rights requires a high level of justification. Rights
which have been held fundamental and subject to strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause are the right to vote, 4 the right to marry"5
and the right to travel. 6
It has been said that the application of strict scrutiny to legislation is
strict in theory but usually fatal in fact.57 Because the state must show
not only that it has a compelling interest but also that the law furthers
that interest in the least discriminatory or burdensome manner, 8 few
laws have survived the test. One exception is Korematsu v. United
States,59 where the Court upheld a post-Pearl Harbor military order ex-
cluding from certain west coast areas persons of Japanese ancestry, re-
gardless of whether they were United States citizens or not. The Court
concluded there was a compelling need to prevent espionage and sabo-
tage and that, under the circumstances, the internment of these persons
was the best means available." However, Korematsu has been consist-
ently criticized and is likely limited to its unique wartime facts.6'
C. Intermediate Scrutiny, a "Grey Area"
As has been stated, legislation seldom fails the rational basis test or
54. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidated Tennessee residency duration
requirement because it impaired right to vote and right to travel); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidated New York statute which restricted right
to vote in school district elections); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)
(held unconstitutional requirement of poll tax as prerequisite to vote). But see Salyer Land Co.
v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (held that where state is pursu-
ing "special purpose" wider discretion for regulation of voting is allowed).
55. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (held invalid Wisconsin statute requiring
court approval for marriage of any resident under court order to support minor child); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (held invalid Virginia statute banning interracial marriage).
56. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). See supra note 54; see also Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (held residency requirement for receiving welfare benefits im-
pinged fundamental right to travel interstate).
57. See Gunther, supra note 35.
58. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
59. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reh'g denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1945).
60. Id. at 219-20.
61. See generally Rostrow, The Japanese American Cases: A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489
(1945). Fred Korematsu, who was convicted of violating the exclusion order, brought a peti-
tion for a writ of coram nobis to vacate his conviction on grounds of governmental misconduct.
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). His petition was granted.
Id. at 1420; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upheld conviction for
violation of military curfew); Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash.
1986) (petition for writ of coram nobis granted in part and denied in part).
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survives a strict scrutiny analysis. The Court has, therefore, been con-
sistently troubled by legislative classifications which do not fit easily into
these two categories. Where a group possesses some of the characteris-
tics which qualify a group as suspect, the Court has sometimes character-
ized the group as "quasi-suspect" and applied a somewhat heightened, or
intermediate level of judicial scrutiny.62 In addition, where a law sub-
stantially impinges on a right which is not fundamental but may be
deemed "important," the Court has sometimes been prompted to employ
more careful scrutiny.63 Generally, however, it is a combination of these
factors that triggers intermediate scrutiny.
Intermediate level equal protection analysis is often the most confus-
ing level because the Court is generally vague in identifying the criteria it
is usingf" However, the standard is usually held to be one requiring a
state to demonstrate that the law is substantially related to the achieve-
ment of an "important" state interest.6 5 As with strict scrutiny, the bur-
den of proof is on the state.e 6 However, the Court does not require that
the law be as closely tailored to the alleged purpose as under a strict
scrutiny analysis.67
Legislative classifications based on gender have been held subject to
this intermediate level of judicial scrutiny for equal protection pur-
poses.68  The Court has recognized that women possess many of the
characteristics of a traditionally suspect class. 69 They have been sub-
62. See L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 1082-92 for a general discussion of the Court's applica-
tion of intermediate scrutiny to quasi-suspect classes.
63. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (held education to be an important interest
which court may consider in determining applicable level of judicial scrutiny).
64. See generally Blattner, The Supreme Court's "Intermediate" Equal Protection Deci-
sions: Five Imperfect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1981);
Seeburger, The Muddle of the Middle Tier: The Coming Crisis in Equal Protection, 48 Mo. L.
REv. 587 (1983).
65. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218-19 & n.16; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also L.
TRIBE, supra note 33, at 1082-92.
66. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (held policy of ex-
cluding men from state supported nursing school invalid because state failed to demonstrate
policy was substantially related to important interest).
67. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (held invalid section of Social Security Act
providing greater old-age benefits for women than men); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(held invalid statute allowing females to purchase 3.2% beer at younger age than men).
68. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); see also Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976). But cf Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upheld exclu-
sion of women from Illinois bar).
69. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero, the Court actually applied
strict scrutiny. Id. at 688. However, in subsequent cases, the Court retreated to an intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny for gender-based classifications. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190
(1976).
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jected to societal discrimination on the basis of their sex7° and, until re-
cent years, have been politically powerless due to this immutable
characteristic. 71 In addition, because gender is generally irrelevant to an
individual's ability to contribute to society, laws which classify on the
basis of sex are difficult to justify.7"
Intermediate level scrutiny has been applied to all gender-based clas-
sifications, including legislation that discriminates against men. In Mis-
sissippi University for Women v. Hogan,73 the Court held invalid a policy
of limiting enrollment in a state nursing school to women while denying
admittance to otherwise qualified men. The University claimed that the
purpose of its admissions policy was to compensate for discriminatory
barriers women faced in the past.74 However, the Court concluded that
the policy actually perpetuated the stereotype that nursing is exclusively
a woman's profession. 75 Because the state had failed to establish the req-
uisite nexus between the classification and the proposed objective, the
policy was held invalid.76
Another legislative classification that has triggered this intermediate
level of review is illegitimacy.77 Recently, legislation classifying children
of undocumented alien status has also been subjected to this higher level
of scrutiny.78 In Plyler v. Doe,79 the Court applied intermediate scrutiny
to invalidate a Texas law that withheld local school funding for undocu-
mented alien children. The Court noted such factors as the importance
of education, the stigma of illiteracy" and the immutability of the chil-
dren's condition."'
However, the Court has demonstrated an increased reluctance to
extend this heightened scrutiny to other classifications. In Massachusetts
Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 2 it refused to apply a heightened level of
70. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684.
71. Id. at 685-86.
72. Id. at 686.
73. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
74. Id. at 727.
75. Id. at 729-30.
76. Id. at 730.
77. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (held invalid portion of Illinois intestate
succession plan preventing illegitimate children from inheriting from their fathers).
78. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 222.
81. Id. at 220. It should be noted that under the standard in Plyler, the alienage classifica-
tion does not, of itself, trigger heightened scrutiny. In Plyler, the Court granted heightened
scrutiny due to the fact that the class affected was that of undocumented alien children who
were being denied the important right of education. Id. at 220-22.
82. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
April 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:921
scrutiny to an age-based classification. The Court conceded that "treat-
ment of the aged.., has not been wholly free of discrimination" but
concluded that the aged "have not experienced a 'history of purposeful
unequal treatment'" or suffered discrimination "on the basis of stereo-
typed characteristics .. - "83 Therefore, the Court declined to extend the
heightened scrutiny afforded gender-based classifications to age-based
classifications.
D. The Tiered Approach in Perspective
The tiered approach to equal protection analysis described above
has prompted sharp criticism from members of the Court itself, particu-
larly in recent years.84 The criticism primarily expresses three views:
(1) that the tiered approach invites vague, result-oriented decisions, often
limited to facts of a particular case and of little guidance to lower
courts;8s (2) that increased judicial scrutiny of a classification based on a
characteristic other than race or national origin is historically inconsis-
tent with the purpose of the equal protection clause86 and (3) that a vari-
able standard of review with graduated levels of application is preferable
to a rigidly applied tiered standard. 7 The decision in City of Cleburne v.
83. Id. at 313. The Court has also refused to apply heightened scrutiny to classifications
based on wealth. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
84. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). "[O]ur cases
reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications which have been ex-
plained in opinions by terms ranging from 'strict scrutiny' at one extreme to 'rational basis' at
the other. I have never been persuaded that these so called 'standards' adequately explain the
decisional process." Id. at 3260-61 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
How is [a court] to determine whether a particular law is "substantially" related to
the achievement of [an important] objective, rather than related in some other way to
its achievement?... [T]he phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic as to invite
subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation,
masquerading as judgments whether such legislation is directed at "important"
objectives or, whether the relationship to those objectives is "substantial" enough.
Id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), where Justice Harlan stated the follow-
ing in his dissent: "I think that ... the 'compelling interest' doctrine is sound when applied to
racial classifications, for historically the Equal Protection Clause was largely a product of the
desire to eradicate legal distinctions founded upon race. However, I believe that the more
recent extensions have been unwise." Id. at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (heightened review should apply
only in those areas "in which the Framers obviously meant [the clause] to apply-classifica-
tions based on race or on national origin, the first cousin of race. . . ."). See generally J. ELY,
supra note 41, at 148-50.
87. Justice Marshall has, for many years, advocated an approach to equal protection
analysis which ignores "tiers" altogether. He believes that the level of scrutiny employed
should vary with "'the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected
and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
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Cleburne Living Center"8 reflects the Supreme Court's concerns regard-
ing each of these criticisms. Because the court of appeals decision under
review utilized the three-tiered approach, 9 the Court granted certio-
rari,90 in part, to evaluate this approach and give guidance in the equal
protection area. The results, however, are far from illuminating.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In July of 1980, Jan Hannah purchased a building in Cleburne,
Texas, intending to lease it to Cleburne Living Centers (CLC).91 CLC
planned to use the four-bedroom, two-bath house to operate a group
home for approximately thirteen mentally retarded men and women who
would be constantly supervised by CLC staff.92 CLC also intended to
comply with all state and federal regulations applicable to the proposed
home.
93
CLC was informed by the City of Cleburne (City) that a special use
drawn."' City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3265 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 230-31 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 318-27 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417,
432-33 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-30 (1970) (Marshall, I.,
dissenting). Under Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach, to determine how strictly a
law should be scrutinized, a court should consider three factors: "the importance of the gov-
ernmental benefits denied, the character of the class [affected], and the asserted state interests
." Murgia, 427 U.S. at 322 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall's approach is based on the idea that "all interests [that are] not 'funda-
mental' and all classes [that are] not 'suspect' are not [necessarily] the same." Id. at 321
(Marshall, J., dissenting). He has urged that the Court, rather than adhere to a rigid tiered
approach, acknowledge that these variations in the importance of interests and in the invidi-
ousness of classifications require a flexible standard of analysis. Justice Marshall's theory is
that "[tihe advantage of a flexible equal protection standard ... is that it can readily accomo-
date such variables." Id. at 325 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
89. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
90. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 469 U.S. 1016 (1984).
91. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3252 (1985). By the time
this case came before the Supreme Court, Cleburne Living Centers, Inc. had changed its name
to Community Living Centers, Inc. ("CLC"), and Jan Hannah was vice-president and part
owner of CLC. Id. at 3252 n.l. The Court in Cleburne referred to Hannah and CLC as
"CLC" and the same shall be done throughout this Note.
92. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3252.
93. CLC planned to operate the home as a private Intermediate Care Facility for the Men-
tally Retarded (ICF-MR) under a joint federal and state reimbursement program for residen-
tial services to the mentally retarded. Id. at n.2.
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permit, renewable each year, would be required to operate the home. 94
The City had determined that a zoning ordinance requiring such a per-
mit for construction of" '[h]ospitals for the insane and feeble-minded'"
was applicable to the proposed CLC home.95 In accordance with the
City's requirement, CLC applied for the permit. It was denied first by
the City's Zoning and Planning Commission and then, following a public
hearing, by a three-to-one vote of the City Council. 96
CLC filed suit in federal district court against the City and several of
its officials. CLC alleged that the zoning ordinance was invalid both on
its face and as applied 97 because it discriminated against CLC and its
proposed mentally retarded residents in violation of their equal protec-
tion rights.98 The district court recognized that the City's requirement
was "'motivated primarily by the fact that the residents... would be
mentally retarded.. . .'" but determined, under the rational basis test,
that the ordinance was rationally related to the City's legitimate interests
in regulating this group and thus valid both on its face and as applied. 99
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that
because the mentally retarded share many of the characteristics of a tra-
94. Id. at 3252.
95. Id. (quoting Cleburne's zoning ordinance). The home was located in an area zoned
"R-3," an "Apartment House District." Id. at n.3. Permitted uses for an R-3 district were
listed in section eight of the ordinance and included:
"1. Any use permitted in District R-2.
2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings.
3. Boarding and lodging houses.
4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories.
5. Apartment hotels.
6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or aged,
other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug addicts.
7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is car-
ried on as a business.
8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal institutions.
9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses. .. ."
Id. (quoting Cleburne's zoning ordinance, emphasis added by Court). Section 16 of the ordi-
nance listed those uses for which a special permit was required, including " '[h]ospitals for the
insane or feeble-minded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions.'"
Id. In addition to a limitation on the special permit of one year, applicants were required "'to
obtain the signature of the property owners within two-hundred (200) feet of the property to be
used.'" Id. (quoting Cleburne's zoning ordinance).
96. Id. at 3252-53 & n.4.
97. Invalidating the ordinance on its face would mean that it could never be imposed in its
present form. Finding the ordinance invalid as applied would only mean that the requirement
could not be imposed on CLC, but might be valid in other instances.
98. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3253.
99. Id. (quoting Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, No. CA 3-80-1576-F, slip op.
(N.D. Tex. April 16, 1982)). The district court applied only the minimum level of judicial
scrutiny after concluding that no fundamental right was involved and that mental retardation
was neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect classification. Id.
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ditionally suspect class, heightened scrutiny was warranted." ° In addi-
tion, the court held that although a fundamental right was not affected,
an "important benefit" was denied by the ordinance.101 Applying an in-
termediate level of scrutiny, the court determined that the City had not
demonstrated that the ordinance was sufficiently related to its purported
purpose.
10 2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 10 3 af g in
part and vacating in part.1" Rejecting the court of appeals' determina-
tion that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect classification, the Court
held that only a rational basis test was required in this case.105 Yet, after
applying that test, the Court concluded there was no rational basis for
the City's belief that the proposed group home threatened the City's le-
gitimate interests in a way which permitted uses did not. 10 6 Therefore,
the Court held that the ordinance, as applied,10 7 denied CLC equal pro-
tection under the law. 10
8
A. Reasoning of the Court
1. The majority
Justice White delivered the majority opinion in City of Cleburne v.
100. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). In determining that the mentally retarded were a
quasi-suspect class, the court noted the history of discrimination against the mentally retarded
sparked by "deep-seated historical prejudice," their political powerlessness and the immutabil-
ity of their condition. Id. at 197-98.
101. Id. at 199 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)). In Plyler, the Supreme Court
invalidated a statute authorizing local school districts to exclude undocumented alien children
from public schools. The Court held that the children shared characteristics of a suspect class
such as immutability and that education, though not a fundamental right, was an "important"
benefit. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222-23; see also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (held education not a fundamental right). By analogy, the Fifth Circuit in
Cleburne determined that the right of the mentally retarded to establish a home is an "impor-
tant" right. 726 F.2d 191, 199.
102. Cleburne, 726 F.2d at 200. Rehearing en banc was denied with six judges dissenting.
Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 735 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1984). Judge Garwood,
dissenting, argued that the factors cited by the court of appeals were insufficient to determine
that the mentally retarded constituted a quasi-suspect class. Id. at 833. Stating that the spe-
cial characteristics of the mentally retarded "are highly relevant to proper legislative goals in
most respects," he concluded that in order to qualify as a quasi-suspect class, a class must first
"[meet] a threshold level of lack of significant dissimilarity from the rest of society." Id. at
833-34.
103. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984).
104. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3252.
105. Id. at 3256, 3258.
106. Id. at 3260; see supra note 95.
107. See supra note 97.
108. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3260.
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Cleburne Living Center. 10 9 The opinion began with an articulation of the
general rule of equal protection analysis: that "legislation is presumed to
be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest."11 The Court stressed
that particularly in the areas of social or economic legislation, states are
given wide latitude as it is assumed the democratic process will serve to
correct any "improvident" decisions."' The Court then delivered a brief
historical overview of its application of the equal protection clause to
various situations, noting those circumstances in which a strict,1 2 inter-
mediate113 or rational basis' 14 analysis is deemed appropriate.
The Court held that the court of appeals had erred in concluding
that mental retardation is a quasi-suspect classification requiring a "more
exacting standard" than that afforded economic and social legislation.I1 I
The Court set out the following four reasons in support of this
conclusion.
First, the majority asserted that the mentally retarded persons' "re-
duced ability to cope" made them different in a way which is relevant to
109. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens
and O'Connor also joined in the opinion.
110. Id. at 3254 (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979);
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)).
111. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3254.
112. Id. at 3255. The Court stressed that where a statute creates classifications based on
race, alienage or national origin, "[tihese factors are... seldom relevant to the achievement of
any legitimate state interests ...." Id. Also, because such legislation is likely based on preju-
dice and antipathy towards these groups, there is less likelihood that it will be rectified through
legislative means. Id. (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)). Thus, such legislation will only be sustained where it is
closely tied to a compelling state interest. Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that strict scru-
tiny also applies where rights protected under the Constitution are impaired. Id. (citing
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)); see also supra
text accompanying notes 38-56.
113. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255. The Court noted that classifications such as gender and
illegitimacy have been afforded a heightened level of scrutiny since these characteristics bear
little or no relationship to an" 'individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society'"
and are beyond the individual's control. Id. (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505
(1976)). Legislation based on these characteristics will only be sustained if "substantially re-
lated to a sufficiently important governmental interest." Id. at 3255 (citations omitted).
114. Id. The Court asserted that "[w]here individuals in [a] group affected by law have
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the state has authority to implement. . . "
courts have been reluctant to scrutinize too closely. Id. (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)). See infra note 125 and supra text accompanying notes
82-83.
115. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255-57.
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the states' legitimate interests.116 The Court noted that because treat-
ment of the mentally retarded is determined by the degree of disability,
this difficult and technical task should be left to legislators.1 17 The ma-
jority reasoned that because legislators are in a position where they can
be guided by qualified professionals, substantive judgments concerning
the mentally retarded are better left in their hands than in the hands of
an "ill-informed" judiciary. 18
Second, the Court noted a "distinctive" response on the part of the
legislature to the plight of the mentally retarded. 19 Expressing concern
that a heightened level of scrutiny might impede legislation designed to
benefit the mentally retarded, the Court held that legislatures must have
flexibility to shape remedial efforts without being watched too closely by
an intrusive judiciary. 2
The Court's third reason for denying quasi-suspect status to the
mentally retarded was the degree of response by the legislature. 121 It
concluded that because federal and state legislatures have responded with
legislation sensitive to the needs of the mentally retarded, claims that this
group is politically powerless, with no ability to effect changes in the law,
had been negated.1 22 The Court minimized the fact that the mentally
retarded often lack the ability to "assert direct control over the legisla-
ture," and expressed concern that if this were a criterion for triggering a
higher level of scrutiny, much legislation in the social and economic area
would be rendered suspect.
12 3
Finally, the Court voiced its concern that if the mentally retarded
were deemed a quasi-suspect class deserving of a heightened standard of
legislative review, other groups similarly situated would demand the
same treatment.12 4 The Court cited such groups as the aged, 125 the dis-
116. Id. at 3256.
117. Id. The degree of disability that affects mentally retarded individuals varies within
four categories. Id. at 3256 n.9. Most (approximately 89%) are only "mildly retarded" and
possess an IQ between 50 and 70. Approximately 6% are categorized as "moderately re-
tarded" having IQ's between 35 and 50. "Severely" mentally retarded individuals (IQ's of 20-
35) and those who are "profoundly" retarded (IQ's below 20) together comprise only 5% of
the mentally retarded population. Id. (citing testimony of Dr. Philip Roos). The Court con-
cluded that these varying degrees of retardation may be relevant to legitimate state interests
and that deference to legislative motives is preferred. Id. at 3256.
118. Id.
119. Id.




124. Id. at 3257-58.
125. The Court has refused to apply heightened scrutiny to legislative classifications based
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abled, and the mentally 1126 as sources of this concern. 127
After determining that the rational basis test was the appropriate
standard in this case, the Court examined the City's justification for re-
quiring the special use permit. The district court had determined that
the City's reasons included concerns: (1) about the negative attitude of
most of the property owners located within 200 feet of the home, as well
as the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood;128 (2) that students
attending the junior high school across from the CLC home might harass
the residents;12 9 (3) that the home was located on a "flood plain;" 3 ' and
(4) that CLC intended the home to be occupied by too many people.1
31
After considering the City's concerns, the Court concluded that none of
them justified denial of the permit. Because there was no rational basis
for the City's belief that the CLC home threatened its legitimate interests
in a way that permitted uses did not, the Court found that the ordinance,
as applied to the CLC home, was unconstitutional.
1 32
on age. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); see also supra
text accompanying notes 82-83.
126. The Court has never addressed the issue of whether the mentally ill are a suspect or
quasi-suspect class. In Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981), mentally ill patients chal-
lenged § 1611 (e)(1) of the Supplemental Security Income Act (SSI) because it denied them
Medicaid benefits due to the fact that they were institutionalized in public mental institutions.
The Court ruled that this group had not been denied equal protection of the laws, as it was
only a subset of a larger group of publicly institutionalized persons. Id. at 231-34. The Court
refused, however, to reach the question of whether the mentally ill deserve heightened scru-
tiny. Id.
127. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3257-58.
128. Id. at 3259. The Court determined that
mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cogni-
zable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home for the
mentally retarded differently from [other permitted uses] .... "Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect."
Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
129. Id. at 3259. The Court found this concern unfounded, since the school itself was at-
tended by approximately thirty mentally retarded students. Id.
130. Id. The Court determined that no increased hazard of flooding existed for this home
than would exist if it were operated by a group that did not require a special permit. Id.
131. Id. at 3259-60. The Court rejected the argument that density requirements would be
different for mentally retarded residents than for other potential residents. Id. The City had
also argued that its ordinance was aimed at "avoiding congestion of population and at lessen-
ing congestion of the streets." Id. at 3260. This assertion was rejected as well. Id.
132. Id. at 3260. The Court did not affirm the court of appeals' decision to facially invali-
date the ordinance. The Court's position was that upon a finding that the requirement of the
special use permit denied the proposed CLC residents equal protection of the laws, there was
no need to make a broader constitutional determination. Id. at 3258.
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2. Justice Stevens' concurrence
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion centered on his belief that the
three-tiered approach to equal protection analysis does not logically ex-
plain what the Court is doing. Justice Stevens asserted that although the
Court's approach is often termed "rational," "intermediate," or "strict,"
in actuality the Court has really applied only one "rational basis" test
encompassing all aspects of the equal protection challenge.133 In addi-
tion, Justice Stevens rejected the idea that the "strict" or "heightened"
scrutiny tests provide adequate standards since classifications such as
residency, gender, age or mental retardation cannot be categorized
into clearly defined classifications.' 34 Noting that these classifications
have never been well-defined, he suggested abandoning such labels
altogether. 3 '
Justice Stevens expressed the view that one rational basis test would
be an adequate means of evaluating legislative classifications. Under his
test, a court would be asked to examine what class had been harmed,
whether that class had been subjected to a "tradition of disfavor" and
whether the characteristic of the "disadvantaged class" justified its treat-
ment. 13 6 Justice Stevens asserted that this inquiry would automatically
invalidate racial classifications and, conversely, would validate most eco-
nomic classifications.'37 Accordingly, this test would provide flexibility
for a court evaluating classifications affecting groups possessing charac-
teristics found to be "sometimes relevant and sometimes irrelevant to a
valid public purpose."' 38 Thus, legislation would be found invalid not
because it failed an "intermediate" level of scrutiny, but because it was
not rational in light of its purported purpose.
139
Justice Stevens asserted that his proposed application of the rational
133. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3261 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
134. Id. at 3261 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens referred to his concurring opinion
in United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180-81 (1980), where he advo-
cated a test by which the Court would scrutinize the "correlation between the classification
and either the actual purpose of the statute or a legitimate purpose that [the Court] may rea-
sonably presume to have motivated an impartial legislature." Id. at 3261 n.5 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
135. Id. at 3260-61 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
136. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3261-62 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens warned that
the Court must be "especially vigilant in evaluating the rationality" of legislative classifications
concerning groups which have been traditionally disfavored because it is easy for "habit, rather
than analysis" to create the appearance that such classifications are rational. Id. at 3261 n.6
(Stevens, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 3262 (Stevens, J., concurring).
138. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
139. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
April 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:921
basis test was adequate to evaluate legislation affecting groups such as the
mentally retarded because their characteristics may be relevant to some
legislative decisions, particularly those providing for special education or
treatment. 14° He also noted that some restrictive legislation concerning
the mentally retarded may be valid where the restrictions imposed are
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 141 However, with regard
to Cleburne's zoning ordinance, Justice Stevens concluded that the per-
mit requirement was not based on a legitimate concern for mentally re-
tarded persons who would reside in the home, but on "irrational fears of
neighboring property owners."' 42 He therefore concurred in the major-
ity's conclusion that the statute was invalid as applied, but maintained
that the same result could have been achieved through application of his
suggested test.
143
3. Justice Marshall's opinion
Justice Marshall agreed with the majority's conclusion that the ordi-
nance was invalid as applied to the mentally retarded, but dissented with
respect to three aspects of the Court's analysis: (1) the Court's non-tradi-
tional application of the rational basis test; (2) the Court's conclusion
that the mentally retarded were not a quasi-suspect class; and (3) the
Court's decision only to invalidate the ordinance as applied rather than
on its face. 144
Justice Marshall criticized the majority's application of the rational
basis test for two reasons. First, he stated his firm belief that a "more
searching scrutiny" than the minimum scrutiny of a rational basis test
was required to invalidate Cleburne's ordinance.'45 Second, he argued
that the rational basis test applied by the majority was very different than
the traditional test in that it required the City to justify the ordinance.'46
140. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). "A mentally retarded person could also recognize that he
is a member of a class that might need special supervision in some situations, both to protect
himself and to protect others." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
141. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Laws restricting the "right to drive cars or to operate
hazardous equipment" may be based on a legitimate concern that the diminished abilities of
the mentally retarded may increase the risk associated with such activities. Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
142. Id. at 3262-63 (Stevens, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 3263 (Stevens, J., concurring).
144. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3263 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall was joined in his opinion by Jus-
tices Brennan and Blackmun.
145. Id. at 3264 n.2 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 3264 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 484 (1955); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959)). As
evidence that the burden of proof had shifted to the City, Justice Marshall noted the fact that
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Noting the danger of "[t]he suggestion that the traditional rational basis
test allows this sort of searching inquiry... ," he expressed concern that
the majority's analysis would create a precedent by which this stricter
rational basis test could be applied to all economic and commercial clas-
sifications. 147 Alternatively, he warned that if the majority was actually
invoking a "second order" rational basis test, lower courts would have no
guidance as to when this test should apply.14
Justice Marshall argued that legislation classifying on the basis of
the characteristic of mental retardation should be afforded a higher level
of scrutiny. First, he noted that the interest of the mentally retarded in
establishing a group home was substantial and could be considered a
"fundamental" liberty deserving of a higher level of scrutiny. 49 He fur-
ther asserted that the "'lengthy and tragic history' of segregation and
discrimination" of the mentally retarded called for a searching inquiry
into legislation affecting their rights.' Justice Marshall advocated a
system of analysis which would vary depending on the constitutional im-
portance of the interest affected and the "recognized invidiousness" of
the classification.1 ' Thus, Justice Marshall concluded that considera-
tion of the important interest involved (the right to establish a home), as
well as the long history of prejudice against the mentally retarded, war-
ranted closer scrutiny than that generally applied to commercial and eco-
nomic legislation." 2
Justice Marshall also criticized the majority's view that heightened
scrutiny is inapplicable where distinguishing characteristics of a group
may sometimes properly be taken into account by legislatures. He ar-
gued that if this view were adopted, classifications based on gender and
illegitimacy could not be afforded this level of scrutiny since many tradi-
the majority had found it "difficult to believe" the City's purported justifications. This stan-
dard is contrary to the standard of proof under the traditional rational basis test in which the
challenging party bears the burden of proof. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
147. Id. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall
criticized this analysis as reminiscent of the decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). See supra note 24 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lochner.
148. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
149. Id. at 3266 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall
noted the district court's finding that "'[t]he availability of [a group] home in communities is
an essential ingredient of normal living patterns for persons who are mentally retarded .... '"
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150. Id. at 3266-68 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
151. Id. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra note 87
and accompanying text for a discussion of this "sliding scale" approach.
152. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3265-66 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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tionally "suspect" characteristics may be relevant to a state's interest in
some circumstances. 15 3 Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's
position that heightened scrutiny was not required simply because
mental retardation is relevant to a state's interests in many instances.'54
He argued that just because a government may have legitimate reasons
for classifying in some circumstances, this does not prevent the need for
more "careful review" since there is still reason to suspect that the legis-
lature may have acted with prejudice.'55
The majority's conclusion that the mentally retarded are not politi-
cally powerless was flatly rejected by Justice Marshall." 6 He took issue
with the majority's view that heightened scrutiny is no longer required
due to the fact that some legislatures have recognized discriminatory
practices against the mentally retarded and acted to correct them. Jus-
tice Marshall argued that this view was inconsistent with the historical
application of the equal protection clause, noting that judicial concern
has not lessened in the areas of gender-based and racial classifications
merely because these groups are now politically mobilized or represented
by others in the government.' 7
Justice Marshall's final criticism of the majority's opinion involved
its failure to hold the City's zoning ordinance facially invalid. He voiced
concern that because the majority only held the ordinance invalid as ap-
plied to the CLC group, mentally retarded groups wishing to establish
group homes in the future would be subject to the imprecision of this
ordinance and forced to "run the act's gauntlet."' 58 He asserted that the
ordinance was overbroad in that it excluded all "feeble-minded" persons
without any specific delineations.' 5 9 Furthermore, he noted that by
striking down the ordinance only as applied to the CLC home, the ma-
jority had not given any indication of when the restrictions of the zoning
153. Id. at 3269-70 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Mar-
shall noted that classifications afforded intermediate scrutiny are also considered relevant
under certain circumstances. For instance, classifications based on gender can seldom be justi-
fied, but permissible distinctions have been allowed if they "bear a reasonable relationship to
their relevant characteristics." Id. at 3270 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 70 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original)).
154. Id. at 3270-71 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
155. Id. at 3270 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156. Id. at 3268-69 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 3272 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. Id. at 3273 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The term "feeble-
minded" is used here only because of its use in the Cleburne ordinance. See supra note 95 and
accompanying text. Also, see infra note 320 for a discussion of the term "feeble-minded" and
its negative inferences; see also infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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ordinance requirements could be imposed. 6' Justice Marshall concluded
that because the ordinance was most likely rooted in irrational prejudice
and because it created an overbroad presumption, the preferred course of
action would be to strike it down on its face.161
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center 62 raises four issues which require analysis. First, the majority's
conclusion that the mentally retarded are not a quasi-suspect class, in
spite of the fact that they possess many of the characteristics of a tradi-
tionally suspect class, leaves unclear what factors, if any, will trigger a
heightened level of scrutiny. The concern is that lower courts will be
unsure of the intent of the Court's analysis and whether future applica-
tion of intermediate level scrutiny will be limited to those areas where the
Court has already deemed it appropriate. The second issue concerns the
rational basis test as applied in Cleburne, its inconsistency with prior
cases applying this level of scrutiny and the problems faced by courts
applying the test in the future. The third issue is whether the Court's
"as-applied" invalidation of the Cleburne ordinance is consistent with
the Court's approach in similar equal protection cases. Finally, the po-
tential impact of this apparently ad hoe approach regarding the mentally
retarded and similarly situated groups will be analyzed.
A. Rejection of Quasi-Suspect Classification for the Mentally Retarded:
A Rationale for Preventing Entry Into the Class
The majority in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center163 firmly
rejected the court of appeals' assessment of relevant factors concerning
the mentally retarded as well as its determination that the mentally re-
tarded are a quasi-suspect class.164 The court of appeals165 had con-
cluded that the City of Cleburne's ordinance was subject to an
intermediate level of scrutiny for two reasons: (1) although the mentally
retarded are not a "full-fledged suspect class," they share many charac-
teristics of that class; 1 66 and (2) the ordinance as applied withheld a bene-
fit which, though not fundamental, was extremely important to the
160. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3273 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. Id. at 3273-74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
163. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 115-27.
165. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984), affd in part,
vacated in part, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
166. Id. at 198-99.
April 19871
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:921
mentally retarded.' 67 That court also cited other factors concerning the
mentally retarded such as the immutability of their condition, their polit-
ical powerlessness, the "history of unfair and often grotesque mistreat-
ment" and the likelihood that discrimination against the mentally
retarded reflects deep-seated prejudice. 168
The Supreme Court's rejection of the court of appeals' analysis is a
departure from precedent set by prior Supreme Court cases. Factors
such as political powerlessness, immutability and a tradition of irrational
prejudice have consistently been cited by the Court to justify a higher
level of scrutiny for legislation classifying on the basis of race, 169 gen-
der 170 or alienage.' 71  The Supreme Court's conclusion that these factors
are insufficient to render the mentally retarded quasi-suspect indicates a
reluctance to grant any degree of "suspect" status to any more groups
possessing characteristics analogous to classes previously recognized as
suspect or quasi-suspect. The majority's response in Cleburne is not only
perplexing in the light of past history, but, more importantly, may
threaten future protection of such groups from discriminatory
legislation.
Since the days of United States v. Carolene Products Co. ,172 the
Court has recognized that where "prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities, . . . tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily ... relied upon to protect minorities, . . . a corre-
spondingly more searching judicial inquiry [may be called for]." '173
Thus, closer judicial scrutiny has been applied to classifications based on
alienage, 74 gender 75 or race176 because there is reason to suspect that a
167. Id. at 197-98.
168. Id. at 197. The court relied heavily on the analysis applied in Plyler v. Doe, discussed
supra in text accompanying notes 78-81. For an argument that Plyler should have been limited
to its facts, see Note, Constitutional Law: Activating the Middle Tier After Plyler v. Doe:
Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 38 OgLA. L. Rv. 145 (1985).
169. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
172. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
173. Id. at 152 n.4.
174. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (state may not prevent resident alien from
practicing law); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (state may not bar aliens from
holding positions in state civil service); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state may
not deny welfare benefits to aliens). Griffiths, Sugarman and Graham all were decided under a
strict scrutiny analysis. But cf. Cabell v. Chavez Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (state has discre-
tion to ban aliens from jobs as probation officers because the restriction serves a "political"
purpose rather than economic; strict scrutiny still required if economic); Foley v. Connelie,
435 U.S. 291 (1978) (state may prevent aliens from becoming state troopers because state
troopers are engaged in the execution of "broad public policy"); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982) (intermediate level scrutiny applied to invalidate state statute preventing chil-
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legislature which discriminates on the basis of these characteristics may
have less than pure motives.
The similarity between the plight of the mentally retarded and these
other protected groups is not difficult to see. As of 1979, most states did
not allow the mentally disabled to vote. 177 Thus, this group has gener-
ally been dependent upon others to protect its interests. Furthermore,
the mentally retarded have suffered a history of prejudice and discrimina-
tion which, as Justice Marshall stated, "can only be called grotesque."
178
Treatment of the mentally retarded has ranged from isolation in stigma-
tizing institutions1 79 to forced sterilization urged by the Eugenics move-
ment.18 0 Only in recent years has the federal government mandated any
dren of undocumented aliens from attending public schools); San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see supra note 101 & notes 68-76 and accompanying text..
175. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (state nursing school's
policy of refusing qualified male students held not substantially related to an important gov-
ernment interest); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state statute forbidding sale of 3.2%
beer to women under 18 and men under 21 held invalid under heightened scrutiny analysis);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statute that gave benefits to dependent wives of
servicemen regardless of "actual" dependency but denied the same benefit to husbands of ser-
vicewomen without proof of actual support held invalid under heightened scrutiny standard).
See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
176. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (state statute preventing convicted
criminals from voting held invalid under strict scrutiny analysis because statute was rooted in
racial prejudice); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (ruling granting custody to father of
white child because mother married a black man overruled under strict scrutiny analysis);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejection of "separate but equal" doctrine
regarding racially segregated educational facilities). But see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896) ("separate but equal" accommodations for black and white passengers upheld), over-
ruled, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also supra notes 38-47 and accompa-
nying text.
177. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
178. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3266 & n.8 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
179. Poor conditions in institutions for the mentally retarded continue to be the focus of
much litigation. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman (II), 465 U.S. 89
(1984) (class action brought by mentally retarded citizens challenging dangerous and abusive
treatment at state institution); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (held due process
clause of fourteenth amendment entitles institutionalized mentally retarded citizens to reason-
ably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable restraints and such minimally
adequate training as is reasonable); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman (I), 451
U.S. 1 (1981) (action brought against state institution alleging mistreatment and inadequate
habilitation programs).
180. See S. HERR, RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY FOR RETARDED PEOPLE (1983). The Eugen-
ics movement began in the late nineteenth century and lasted well into the 1930's. Because it
was thought that mental retardation was a source of criminality and immorality, the move-
ment sought to curb reproduction by the mentally retarded. See, e.g., H. CAREY, A PLEA FOR
THE STERILIZATION OF CERTAIN DEFECTIVES, PARTICULARLY THE FEEBLE-MINDED AND
EPILEPTIC (1912); Fernald, The Burden of Feeblemindedness, 17 J. PSYCHO-ASTHENICS 87
(1912). In addition, many states prohibited marriage among the mentally retarded and some
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policy concerning requirements for public education of the mentally re-
tarded. 181 Yet, in spite of these factors, the majority in Cleburne ruled
that the mentally retarded are not even a quasi-suspect class.1
8 2
The majority abruptly dismissed any question of continued antipa-
thy or animus by legislatures toward the mentally retarded that would
warrant increased protection of this group.' 8 3 Noting recent federal and
state legislative responses to the needs of the mentally retarded, the
Court found that such responses belie any "continuing antipathy or prej-
udice." '184 Consequently, it concluded that there is a greater likelihood
that legislation affecting the mentally retarded is based on legitimate con-
cerns which the state may consider, rather than on any underlying
prejudice.' s5
Applying the Court's logic, one would assume that because legisla-
continue to do so. See, eg., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.990 (2) (Baldwin 1984); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.6 (West 1967). See generally, Linn & Bowers, The Historical Falla-
cies Behind Legal Prohibitions of Marriages Involving Mentally Retarded Persons - The Eter-
nal Child Grows Up, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 625 (1978); Shaman, Persons Who Are Mentally
Retarded: Their Right to Marry and Have Children, 12 FAM. L.Q. 61 (1978); Note, The Right
of the Mentally Disabled to Marry: A Statutory Evaluation, 15 J. FAM. L. 463 (1977). At the
height of the Eugenics movement, involuntary sterilization was seen as a way of protecting
society from the perceived threat and burden of mentally retarded people. See, e.g., Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927):
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.... Three genera-
tions of imbeciles are enough.
Id. Buck v. Bell has never been explicitly overruled.
181. See Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5)(B); see infra note 184.
182. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255-56.
183. Id. at 3256.
184. Id. at 3256-57. The Court noted such federal legislation as § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982), which made it unlawful to discriminate against the men-
tally retarded in federally funded programs; the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010(1)-(2), which declared that mentally retarded persons have a
right to receive "'appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation'" in an environment that is
"'least restrictive of [their] personal liberty;' " and the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20
U.S.C. § 1412 (5)(B) (1982) which conditioned state receipt of federal education funds on the
state's assurance that the retarded children be provided with an education that is integrated
with that of non-mentally retarded children "'to the maximum extent appropriate.'"
Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3256-57. In addition, the Court recognized that Texas had also enacted
legislation which paralleled the federal legislation by providing for the "'right to live in the
least restrictive setting appropriate to [their] needs and abilities' " including " 'the right to live
... in a group home.'" Id. (citing Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977, TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 5547-300, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1985)). CLC originally sought relief under this
Act. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3257 n. 11. The pendent state claim was voluntarily dismissed due
to the possibility of federal abstention. Id. It is interesting to note that § 7 of the Texas statute
has never been interpreted by that state. Id.
185. Id. at 3256.
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tures have done "good things" for the mentally retarded, there is no
longer a need for fear that legislation affecting this group may be moti-
vated primarily by prejudice. However, the majority failed to recognize
that favorable legislative action toward a group in one instance does not
mean that the same group will not be prejudicially disfavored in another.
Furthermore, the Court addressed no evidence indicating that the City of
Cleburne itself had enacted any legislation favorable to the interests of
the mentally retarded.186 On the contrary, the majority itself, by con-
cluding that the City's requirement of a special use permit for the CLC
home was based on irrational prejudice, 18 7 recognized that legislatures do
still act with antipathy toward the mentally retarded. The result of the
Court's illogical conclusion is that the Cleburne ordinance, an unques-
tionable example of legislation antipathetic to the mentally retarded,
1 88
remains on that city's books.
The danger of the Court's reasoning is in its assumption that once
legislation favorable to a group has been enacted, the "illness" of preju-
dice is somehow miraculously "cured." This same argument was put
forth long ago in the Civil Rights Cases'89 when, in 1883, Justice Bradley
asserted that since blacks had been freed from slavery, no further need
for "favoritism" under the law was required. 19 A similar argument was
presented in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,9 ' where the Court invali-
dated a minimum wage law for women under the premise that women no
longer required increased protection by the courts. In the Civil Rights
Cases, Justice Harlan eloquently dissented from the majority's short-
sightedness, arguing that although the "aid of beneficent legislation" may
be present, the judiciary's responsibility to provide a watchful eye and
prevent prejudicial legislative acts does not cease. 192 In more recent
years, the idea that close judicial scrutiny equals mere favoritism has
clearly been rejected in the Court's continued recognition of classifica-
tions based on race and gender as suspect.
93
186. The Court did, however, note legislation enacted by the state of Texas acknowledging
the "special status" of the mentally retarded. Id. at 3256-57; see supra note 184.
187. Id. at 3260.
188. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
189. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
190. Id. at 25. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court held sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875 unconstitutional on the basis that Congress had no power to regulate, under the
thirteenth or fourteenth amendments, acts of racial discrimination by individuals rather than
by a state.
191. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Cf Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (sustained law barring
employment of women in factory or laundry for more than 10 hours per day).
192. Id. at 61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
193. See supra notes 38-48, 68-76 and accompanying text & infra note 194; see also Local 28
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In addition, the majority's conclusion that recent legislation recog-
nizing the special needs of the mentally retarded belies the need for con-
tinued close scrutiny is inconsistent with its actions in other areas.
Despite the abundance of affirmative legislation to improve the rights of
racial minorities and women, the Court has continued to recognize the
need for close scrutiny of legislation classifying on the basis of race or
gender.'94 In fact, legislative action in support of such groups has, in the
past, been noted by the Court asjustification for its application of height-
ened scrutiny. For instance, in Frontiero v. Richardson,19 the Court
cited congressional action against gender discrimination as a sign that the
judiciary should also take action, through close analysis of challenged
laws, to strike down laws based on invidious classifications.'
96
1. Political powerlessness and the legislative response
While concluding that a positive legislative response with respect to
the mentally retarded negates suspicion of prejudicial motivation, the
Court further asserted that such legislative action counters any claim
that the mentally retarded as a group are politically powerless.' 97 In one
paragraph, the Court dismissed both the idea that this lack of power
exists, as well as the concept that an inability to "assert direct control"
over the legislature is even a criterion which triggers heightened
scrutiny.
1 98
The Court's conclusion ignores certain significant factors. First, as
noted above, mentally retarded citizens have been, and continue to be,
categorically disqualified from voting in most states. 99 Secondly, even
with advocates working toward better recognition of the needs of the
mentally retarded, such advocacy, although eliciting a legislative re-
of the Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986) and Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of
Fireworkers v. Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986). In both cases, decided July 2, 1986, racially
based affirmative action programs were upheld.
194. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (racial discrimination still warrants strict
scrutiny analysis). Despite tremendous changes in the social and political recognition of wo-
men's and men's rights, the Court still remains strong in its insistence on heightened scrutiny
in this area. See, eg., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (held
invalid policy of excluding males from enrolling in state supported professional nursing
school); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statute concerning medical and dental
benefits for spouses of military personnel held invalid because it discriminated on basis of
gender); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidated statute which gave preferential treat-
ment to males over females in the administering of intestate estates).
195. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
196. Id. at 687-88.
197. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3257 (1985).
198. Id.
199. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
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sponse, does not of itself sustain the conclusion that a group's interests
are being adequately asserted. Under the Court's reasoning, there would
be little reason to continue applying heightened scrutiny in race and gen-
der discrimination since groups such as the National Organization for
Women (NOW) and the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) actively advocate the interests of women and
blacks, and since federal and state governments have enacted legislation
to enforce the rights of these groups. Yet, legislative classifications con-
cerning these groups are still carefully scrutinized by the judiciary.2co
Thirdly, the Court failed to recognize that although some legislators
may sympathize with the needs and rights of the mentally retarded, there
is little likelihood of great empathy.2"1 For instance, a legislator passing
laws limiting the rights of the mentally retarded will never be personally
subject to that legislation. Furthermore, there is even less motivation for
legislators to respond to the needs of the mentally retarded or to act
without prejudice than to respond to similar needs of such protected
groups as women and blacks; every political analyst knows the impor-
tance of the "black vote" or the "women's vote." However, since most
mentally retarded citizens do not even vote, legislators are not likely to
be as concerned with this group's needs or potential vote.2 °2
Clearly, the majority has a strong argument if its assertion is that
inability of a group to effect direct control on the political process should
not, of itself, trigger heightened scrutiny of legislation affecting that
group. Yet, in cases where such political powerlessness has been consid-
ered, it is in combination with other factors such as a history of prejudice
and immutability of the classifying characteristic. 203 Thus, the Court's
dismissal of this factor as a criterion which should ever be considered in
applying heightened scrutiny is questionable in light of past precedent.
200. See supra 194.
201. Lack of empathy toward a "discrete and insular" group is one of the criteria which has
been recognized by the Court in the tradition of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See supra text accompanying note 41.
202. With respect to lack of empathy and political access by minorities, Dean John Hart
Ely has noted:
Political access is surely important, but (so long as it falls short of majority control) it
cannot alone protect a group against [first-degree prejudice], out-and-out hostility,
nor will it even serve effectively to correct the subtler self-aggrandizing biases of the
majority. If voices and votes are all we're talking about, prejudices can easily
survive.
J. ELY, supra note 41, at 161.
203. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 78-81. See also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), discussed
supra at text accompanying notes 73-76.
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2. Immutability, reduced ability to cope, and relevance
of a characteristic
Immutability of a classifying characteristic is another factor the
Court has considered relevant in past determinations that a group de-
serves suspect or quasi-suspect status.2°' The Cleburne majority, how-
ever, quickly dispensed with the fact that mental retardation is an
immutable characteristic, determining it was irrelevant in this case.
20 5
The Court reasoned that immutability of a classifying characteristic will
help trigger heightened scrutiny only where that characteristic is one that
is generally irrelevant to any legitimate government purpose.20 6 Thus,
because the reduced ability of the mentally retarded is often relevant to
legitimate state interests, the Court determined that substantive decisions
concerning this "large and diversified" group are better left to an "in-
formed legislature.
20 7
At first glance, it appears a strong and logical conclusion that where
a group's immutable characteristic is relevant to a legitimate state inter-
est, the state should be afforded wide latitude to legislate the concerns of
that group.20 8 Yet, the Court's analysis is flawed in that it fails to recog-
nize that where the immutable characteristic itself contributes to the
political powerlessness of that group, the necessity for closer judicial
scrutiny may correspondingly increase. For example, in the case of the
mentally retarded, both the existence of extreme historical prejudice and
this group's inability to vote (due to their immutable condition) 20 9 have
204. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (held immutability was relevant factor in apply-
ing heightened scrutiny to legislation affecting undocumented alien children); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (held gender an immutable characteristic irrelevant to an
individual's ability to contribute to society).
205. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3255-56 (1985).
206. Id.
207. Id. & n.10. The majority's position coincides with that of Dean Ely. J. ELY, supra
note 41. His theory is that immutability is only relevant when the immutable characteristic is
one which itself is generally irrelevant to any legitimate purpose. Id. at 150. Examples would
be the immutable characteristics of race and gender which have, in almost all situations, no
relevance to any legitimate state interest. The Court failed to note, however, that Dean Ely
does recognize that immutability is not a completely irrelevant factor in determining whether a
group is suspect. Id.; see infra note 211.
208. With regard to the mentally retarded, for instance, it may be necessary for the legisla-
ture to impose certain restrictions due to that group's reduced abilities. Driving, for example,
or the operation of heavy machinery may be unsafe tasks for those with decreased mental
abilities. See Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3262 (Stevens, J., concurring).
209. Mental retardation is extremely relevant to the issue of political powerlessness because,
as of 1979, most states did not allow the mentally disabled to vote. See Note, Mental Disability
and the Right to Vote, 88 YALE L.J. 1644 (1979). Such individuals have been disenfranchised
for reasons varying from having been adjudicated incompetent to having been committed to
mental institutions. Id. at 1645. At the time the Cleburne ordinance was enacted, the state of
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contributed to their lack of political power. Though it may be true, as
the Court noted, that when a classification is based on an immutable
characteristic it is not automatically rendered suspect or quasi-suspect, 210
it also follows that immutability is not wholly irrelevant.2"
The concern should be whether, as a result of a characteristic an
individual cannot control or change, he or she may be subjected to legis-
lation that discriminates on the basis of the characteristic and also be
politically powerless to change the legislation as a direct result of the
characteristic itself. Immutability of a distinguishing characteristic has
never, of itself, been held to justify rendering a group suspect. Yet immu-
table characteristics such as one's illegitimate birth, gender or color have
been held to be relevant to the level of scrutiny applied when other fac-
tors such as a history of prejudice and lack of political power are also
present.212 In the case of the mentally retarded, not only are these fac-
tors present, but, unlike blacks and women, the mentally retarded are
generally unable to vote due to their condition.2" 3 Where a group is un-
able to effect any direct political change as a result of its disability, surely
there is a need for a closer look at the motives of potentially discrimina-
tory legislation.
Texas denied the right to vote to "idiots or insane persons." TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 5.01
(Vernon Supp. 1978). The Texas code has since been revised and as of January 1, 1986 holds,
in relevant part, that only those "determined mentally incompetent by final judgment of the
court" are denied voting rights. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 11.002(3) (Vernon 1986).
The significance of the inability of the mentally retarded to vote can also be seen by com-
parison to other areas of constitutional law. For example, in reviewing state legislation under
the commerce clause, the courts are particularly suspicious where the burden of adhering to
the law falls primarily on out-of-state interests; these interests are unable to protect themselves
because they have no direct access to the legislative process of that state. See Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). The same concern has prompted careful scrutiny under
the privileges and immunities clause. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948).
210. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3256 & n.10. Even where immutability has been cited as a
factor relevant for determining that heightened scrutiny is required, this has never been the
sole factor. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) discussed supra at text accompanying notes
78-81.
211. The Court quoted Dean Ely for the proposition that immutability is generally an irrel-
evant factor. See supra note 207. The Court neglected to acknowledge Ely's continued
discussion:
Immutability... cannot be the talisman that some have tried to make it, but it isn't
entirely irrelevant either, since classifications geared to characteristics it is not within
the power of the individual to change will not be amenable to immediate and inno-
cent explanation in terms of altering the classifying characteristic's incidence.
J. ELY, supra note 41, at 155.
212. See, for example, the discussion supra at text accompanying notes 68-72 regarding
gender-based classifications. See also supra text accompanying notes 78-81 discussing Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
213. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the true reason for the majority's dismissal of immutability
as a determining factor can be found in its conclusion that where a group
has "distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the state has the
authority to implement," courts must be reluctant to apply a heightened
level of scrutiny out of deference to the separation of powers.214 The
Court's rationale was that since, in many instances, a legislature is justi-
fied in considering a characteristic such as mental retardation relevant to
its goals, heightened scrutiny is not required.215
As Justice Marshall noted, the Court addressed two principles in
support of this view.216 First, the Court held that heightened scrutiny is
inappropriate where individuals in a group have distinguishing character-
istics which a legislature may properly take into account in some circum-
stances.217 Second, the Court asserted that heightened scrutiny is also
inappropriate when many legislative classes that affect the group are
likely valid. 2 18 The Court reasoned that it is the "likelihood that govern-
ment l action premised on a particular classification [such as mental re-
tardation] is valid as a general matter," and not the mere "specifics" of a
case that are important.21 9
The majority's analysis on both counts appears flawed. In the first
instance, distinguishing characteristics possessed by individuals in a
group may vary in degree.22" Merely because some of the individuals in
a group possess characteristics justifying restrictions in certain instances,
restrictions imposed on all members of that group are not necessarily
justified. This is particularly true where, as in the case of the mentally
retarded, there is reason to suspect prejudice with respect to this distin-
guishing characteristic.
214. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255.
215. Justice Marshall raised the valid question of whether the majority's view requires a
calculation of the percentage of situations where a characteristic is relevant to the state's inter-
est as a means of determining whether heightened scrutiny should apply. Id. at 3270-71 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He argued that an "undefined numerical
threshold" of invalid situations is irrelevant to the constitutional issue of heightened scrutiny.
The principles of equality, guaranteed under the equal protection clause, should be enforced
when a classification is '"potentially discriminatory" and not because of some mathematical
conclusion. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra note 102
and accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Garwood's dissenting comments in the court
of appeals decision. The majority of the Supreme Court appears to have followed his
reasoning.
216. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3269-70 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
217. Id. at 3255, 3258.
218. Id. at 3258.
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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A similar flaw exists in the Court's assertion that the appropriate
standard of review is determined by reference to the number of classifica-
tions to which a characteristic could validly be considered relevant.
22 1
Just as it is illogical for the Court to presume that heightened scrutiny is
unnecessary because legislatures have enacted some laws in favor of the
mentally retarded,2 22 it is equally illogical to suggest that because the
characteristic of mental retardation is relevant in many circumstances, it
should be presumed relevant where there is reason to suspect otherwise.
As Justice Marshall noted, "[a] sign that says 'men only' looks very dif-
ferent on a bathroom door than a courthouse door." ' 3 By the same
token, preventing a mentally deficient person from using dangerous ma-
chinery is quite different from denying that same individual access to a
neighborhood which welcomes boarding houses, fraternities and sorori-
ties and institutions for the elderly.224
The majority's position suggests that unless a characteristic is virtu-
ally always irrelevant to any legitimate state interest, a rational basis test
is all that is required. Yet, this position is inconsistent with the Court's
stance in other heightened scrutiny cases. For instance, in Plyler v.
Doe,22 the Court determined that the status of a state resident's citizen-
ship was of legitimate interest to the state and not a "constitutional irrel-
evancy. ' 226  However, because of the suspect characteristics of
undocumented alien children and the interest involved,227 the Court still
chose to apply heightened scrutiny. In addition, gender is generally held
to be irrelevant to any legitimate purpose and legislation classifying on
the basis of gender is subject to heightened scrutiny.2 28 However, certain
gender-based legislation has been upheld because this characteristic may
be relevant to state interests under some circumstances. 229  Thus,
221. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 186-96.
223. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3270 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
224. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
225. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
226. Id. at 223.
227. The Court considered the fact that although the alien parents voluntarily entered the
country illegally, the children's status as undocumented aliens was an immutable characteris-
tic. Id. at 220. Also, the Court held that education, though not a fundamental right guaran-
teed by the Constitution, was important because the stigma of illiteracy is an "enduring
disability." Id. at 221-23.
228. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
229. See Rokster v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upheld Military Services Act which
authorized President to require registration of men but not of women for possible military
service); Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) ("statutory rape" law challenged as
discriminatory because only men could be held criminally liable upheld as furthering compel-
ling state interest of preventing unwanted teenage pregnancies).
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although a characteristic may be relevant to legitimate state interests in
some instances, where there is reason to suspect it is not, a need for
heightened scrutiny should still exist.23
3. Reluctance to expand the class
It is clear that had the Court wished to expand the quasi-suspect
classification to include the mentally retarded, it would have been fully
justified in doing so in reliance on previous cases. As a group, the men-
tally retarded possess many characteristics that have prompted close ju-
dicial scrutiny of legislation burdening a suspect or quasi-suspect class.
Like racial minorities, the mentally retarded have suffered a long history
of deep-seated prejudice and hatred.231 Like aliens, they have, for the
most part, been unable to vote or participate directly in the political pro-
cess.' 32 Legislators are less likely to be empathetic regarding legislative
burdens placed on the mentally retarded as there is little chance they will
ever be subject to the laws they pass.233 And, like undocumented alien
children, mentally'retarded persons are unable to alter their condition.
2 34
Therefore, precedent demonstrates that the court of appeals' analysis and
conclusion that the mentally retarded should be given quasi-suspect sta-
tus was entirely justified.
The primary motivation for the majority's conclusion, therefore,
may lie elsewhere-possibly in the final reason stated by the Court. To
explain its refusal to label the "large and amorphous class of the mentally
retarded" as quasi-suspect, the Court stated that such a decision would
render it difficult to distinguish the mentally retarded from "other groups
who [also] have perhaps immutable disabilities..., who cannot them-
selves mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some
degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large. '2 35 Citing
such groups as the aged, the mentally ill, and the disabled, the Court
indicated its reluctance "to set out on that course.
'236
The majority lamented what it perceived as a difficulty in finding a
"principled way" to distinguish the mentally retarded from these other
230. See supra text accompanying notes 223-24.
231. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 178-81 and accom-
panying text.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53; see also supra note 209.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 201-02.
234. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) and supra note 227 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
235. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3257-58.
236. Id. at 3258; see supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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groups, indicating a fear of opening a floodgate of potential lawsuits.2 37
However, a principled way of distinguishing these groups does exist. For
instance, the mentally retarded can be distinguished from the elderly, one
group which the Court has denied quasi-suspect status.238 This group,
unlike the mentally retarded, can vote. In addition, they have not suf-
fered societal discrimination to the extent of that inflicted upon the men-
tally retarded. Lastly, there is a greater likelihood of empathy on the
part of legislators as they, upon joining the ranks of the elderly, may
personally be subject to the laws they create. Thus, whether or not one
agrees that the rational basis test is appropriate for legislation affecting
the elderly, it is clear that this group can be distinguished from the men-
tally retarded by analyzing and balancing factors such as the extent of
societal and legislative prejudice or empathy, and the degree of the
group's political powerlessness.
The majority's premise that granting the mentally retarded quasi-
suspect status will make it too easy for other groups to get into court is
also unwarranted. The Court should not shirk the responsibility of pro-
tecting constitutional rights of individuals or groups of individuals out of
fear that "everyone will get in;" all constitutional adjudication necessar-
ily requires a degree of balancing interests, both individual and govern-
mental.239 The Court's responsibility, therefore, is to frame a principled
means of analysis, not merely to deny that one exists.
There is another danger in the Court's conclusion. By minimizing
the importance of the suspect-like characteristics of the mentally re-
tarded, the majority view threatens future protection of those classes al-
ready considered suspect or quasi-suspect. Considering that all of the
factors raised and discarded by the Court in Cleburne have been cited by
the same Court to justify greater judicial protection of aliens, racial mi-
norities, and women, the majority's reasoning could seriously weaken the
protected position of these groups. For instance, a future court could
conclude, using the language of Cleburne, that state and federal affirma-
tive action programs also belie any "continuing antipathy or prejudice
... [or] corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judici-
ary.''240 Will the Supreme Court then have a "principled way" of distin-
237. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3257.
238. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), discussed supra
at note 125.
239. See Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of Levels of Scrutiny, 45
OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 174 (1984).
240. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3256.
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guishing women and racial minorities from the mentally retarded and
continue to guarantee close scrutiny of legislation affecting these groups?
At present, it appears that the Court intends continued recognition
by courts that legislation classifying on the basis of certain characteristics
must be subjected to either intermediate or strict scrutiny. The Cleburne
Court acknowledged that strict scrutiny still applies where classifications
are based on race or impinge on fundamental rights, and that classifica-
tions based on illegitimacy or gender still are subject to intermediate level
scrutiny.241 However, the Court's approach demonstrates a move away
from its prior use of such relevant factors as immutability, political
powerlessness and a history of prejudice as determinative of whether a
class should be quasi-suspect. After Cleburne, these factors may do little
to successfully raise the level of scrutiny applied by the Court. Instead, a
new "rational basis" test may be applied.
B. A New Rational Basis Test: Heightened Scrutiny "Rationalized"
Although the majority concluded that only a rational basis test was
appropriate in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,242 the test ap-
plied differed greatly from the conventional one. The traditional rational
basis test is one of extreme deference to the state's legislative process; if it
is determined that the state is acting in pursuit of a legitimate interest or
purpose, all that is required is that the means chosen be rationally related
to that interest.243 Even where there is no stated purpose, the Court may
presume a valid purpose. 2" Furthermore, where the means chosen
either fails to further the alleged goal or produces another, the Court
may still uphold the legislation as long as "it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to [achieve the alleged
purpose]. '24- Thus, legislation is presumed valid and a state is not re-
quired to convince a court of the wisdom of its classifying distinctions.
Rather, unless a challenging party can demonstrate that the state's
"means to an end" is totally unreasonable or arbitrary, the legislation
will pass constitutional muster.
The test applied in Cleburne, however, more closely resembled the
test applied under intermediate scrutiny, where the burden of proof is on
the state to show that the law substantially furthers an important state
241. Id. at 3255.
242. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
243. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
244. Id.; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
245. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (emphasis added); see supra
notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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interest.246 The majority in Cleburne determined that the mentally re-
tarded's reduced ability to cope was, indeed, relevant to the City's inter-
ests.247 The Court then set out to determine if this relevant characteristic
justified the City's requirement of a special use permit for the CLC
home.248 The question was whether a group of mentally retarded per-
sons threatened the legitimate interests of the City in a manner that other
permitted uses would not.249 The Court's final conclusion was that the
City had failed to "rationally justify denying to [the occupants of the
Featherston home] what would be permitted to groups occupying the
same site for different purposes. "250
This analysis constitutes a departure from the usual rational basis
approach. Rather than requiring that CLC demonstrate that there was
no rational basis for the requirement of a special use permit, the Court
required that the City "rationally justify" its decision. This is not the
rational basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.;251 it is more a "ra-
tional justification" test that falls somewhere between the minimal ra-
tional basis test and the intermediate scrutiny applied to gender-based
classifications.
What is most disturbing about this tougher rational basis test is that,
as Justice Marshall noted in his dissent, the Court never indicated why it
was applied or what criteria triggered its application.252 It is perplexing
that, after presenting an exhaustive discussion of its reasons for rejecting
quasi-suspect status for the mentally retarded, the Court proceeded to
apply a test very similar to the intermediate level of scrutiny afforded
legislation affecting such a class. Although apparently determined to
limit further expansion of intermediate level scrutiny, the Court appeared
equally determined to provide some protection for the mentally retarded
246. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
247. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3257.
248. Id. at 3258-60.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 3260.
251. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. Under the Wil-
liamson test, it is likely that the ordinance would have been upheld. For instance, consider the
Court's refusal to believe that the City could be more concerned with the density of a home
occupied by mentally retarded persons than by a permitted group. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at
3259-60. Under the test in Williamson, the Court in Cleburne could have concluded that the
City might have felt that a large group of mentally retarded persons living in the home might
create special safety hazards, just as the legislature of Williamson may have felt opticians were
somehow more in need of regulation than opthalmologists and optometrists. See Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) discussed supra at text accompanying notes 30-33.
252. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3263 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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against prejudicial treatment by local governments. 253 The question then
is what factors triggered the Court's approach and what are the criteria
for applying this new approach.
1. "Second order" rational basis
As Justice Marshall suggested, the Cleburne Court actually em-
ployed a "second order" rational basis test, one that is slightly more
strict than the traditional test.254 The implication might be that the
"toothless" test could still be applied in some cases but that this tougher
test is required in others. As suggested above, however, the difficulty
with this conclusion is that the Court failed to define what criteria may
trigger such a test.
a. irrational prejudice and lack of a rational relationship
It may be that the same factors which the Court found insufficient to
warrant quasi-suspect status for the mentally retarded triggered this
"second order" test. In Cleburne, it was noted that although intermedi-
ate scrutiny was not required, there was a need to not "leave [the men-
tally retarded] entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination.
'255
The majority seemed to acknowledge the possibility that deep-seated
prejudice against the mentally retarded, rather than legitimate goals, may
be the motivation of certain legislation burdening this group. This con-
cern may explain its use of a "heightened" rational basis test in this case.
This would not be the first time the Court has manipulated the ra-
tional basis test and upgraded minimal scrutiny in pursuit of a desired
result. In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,256 the
Court struck down legislation under the rational basis test because it con-
cluded that the means chosen was not related to the purported purpose.
In Moreno, an amendment to the Food Stamp Act made unrelated per-
sons living in the same household ineligible for food stamps.25 7 The
Court determined that this exclusion was not related in any manner to
the Act's goals of helping the nation's agriculture and satisfying nutri-
tional needs.255
Moreno, like Cleburne, represents a departure from the Court's
253. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258 ("Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect
class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination.").
254. Id. at 3264 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
255. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
256. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
257. Id. at 530.
258. Id. at 534.
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usual deference to the legislative body under minimal scrutiny in that the
Court was unwilling to accept just any conceivable basis for the legisla-
tion. In Moreno, there was evidence that the provision to exclude unre-
lated persons from the benefits was motivated by a desire to exclude
"hippie communes. '  The Court indicated that a "bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legiti-
mate government interest."'z" Notably, the majority in Cleburne made
reference to this language of Moreno,261 indicating that Cleburne's ordi-
nance was not only held invalid because the City had failed to demon-
strate that the permit requirement was a rational means to further its
interest. Rather, it was held invalid because the Court suspected that the
actual purpose of the law was not legitimate since it was motivated by
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded as a group.
b. no articulated purpose
The Court has, at times, applied a heightened rational basis test in
cases where the legislature has failed to articulate its purpose, leaving the
Court to speculate as to what legitimate purpose is being furthered. Lo-
gan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. 262 was such a case. Logan concerned a
state employment discrimination statute requiring the state Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commission to convene its review of timely filed com-
plaints within 120 days of the filing.2 63 The alleged purpose was to
expedite processing of claims, but the actual result was that inadvertent
delay by the Commission could cause a loss of jurisdiction over a
claim.26 The Court held that the provision was not a rational method of
achieving the state's objective because it turned "similarly situated claims
into dissimilarly situated ones."
265
One important factor in Logan was that the classification, that is,
the determination that the 120-day cut-off was jurisdictional, was not
drawn by the legislature at all. This decision was made by the judici-
ary.266 Therefore, in Logan, the Court rejected the classification, in part,
on the basis that the legislature had not articulated a purpose consistent
259. Id.
260. Id. (emphasis in original).
261. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3258.
262. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
263. Id. at 424.
264. Id. at 427.
265. Id. at 442. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion which was founded on a
denial of due process. He then wrote separately to address the equal protection issue.
266. Id. at 438-39.
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with the resulting application.267
Similarly, the City of Cleburne did not articulate any purpose for
enacting a requirement of a special use permit for the mentally retarded.
The Court is sometimes more suspicious of purposes set forth post hoc by
lawyers for the state.268 This may explain the majority's questioning of
the purposes put forth by the City in Cleburne. Thus, the lack of a stated
purpose by the City may have triggered the "second order" rational basis
test which required the City to justify that the requirement rationally
furthered the purported goal.
c. carving out exceptions for the politically disadvantaged
Another area in which the Court has applied a more demanding
rational basis test is where a law classifies on the basis of state residency,
thus burdening out-of-state residents.269 The rationale for this approach
is one of fairness. Because out-of-state residents are unable to affect any
direct political change within the state imposing the burden, courts are
more suspicious of such legislation.27 ° In Zobel v. Wlliams, 271 the Court
held that an Alaska statute which distributed annual dividends from
windfall oil revenues to state residents in amounts dependent upon the
recipient's length of residency could not even pass the minimum rational
basis test.2 72 The Court in Zobel departed from its usual rational basis
267. Id. at 440 & n.3.
268. In United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980), the Court upheld
a modification of retirement benefits for railroad workers which allowed those who had
worked for railroads for more than 10 years but less than 25 and had not yet retired to retain
certain "windfall" benefits. Others, who had worked for the same number of years but had
retired, were denied the benefit. Id. at 178. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, took
issue with the majority and argued that legislation should be upheld "only if it is rationally
related to the achievement of an actual legitimate governmental purpose" rather than post hoc
"justifications" put forth by the government's attorneys. Id. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court has, at times, shown a tendency to accept Justices Brennan's and Marshall's
view by stating that a challenged classification must further a legitimate "articulated purpose."
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973) (emphasis added) (upheld statute denying
"good-time" credit to some prisoners but not to others); see also Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (classification will be sustained only if it "rationally
furthers purposes identified by the State"); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (challenged classification will pass constitutional muster only if it "rationally
furthers some legitimate, articulated purpose"). However, it is unclear whether the Court has
incorportated this requirement into its analysis, since it has continued to uphold, as in Fritz,
laws which do not further any articulated purpose. It seems the Court employs this standard
only when it suits the desired result. See Gunther, supra note 35, at 46.
269. See supra second paragraph of note 209 for a discussion of this view.
270. Id.
271. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
272. Id. at 65.
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analysis in which it either readily defers to the purported purpose or pos-
tulates hypothetical objectives to ensure the law's validity. Two other
recent cases involving both a classification based on state residence and a
similar departure from the traditional rational basis test are Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Ward2 73 and Williams v. Vermont.2 74 It is possible,
therefore, that the Court now has also carved out an exception for the
mentally retarded because, like out-of-state residents, they are generally
unable to vote or directly influence the political process.
All of these possible explanations for the Court's "second-order" ap-
proach in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center275 are only specula-
tive. Because the Court never clearly articulated its reasoning or what
factors triggered this stricter rational basis test, a troubling precedent has
been left for lower courts. The true danger in the Court's approach is
that it gives lower courts little guidance as to future application.
2. A rational basis test "with teeth"
An alternative to the "second-order" explanation of the Court's ra-
tionale discussed above is that the Court's decision in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center 276 indicates an intent to strengthen the tradition-
ally "toothless" rational basis test in general, thus tightening the scrutiny
applied to all social and economic legislation. Two recently decided
cases support this proposition. The first is Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. Ward,2 77 in which the Court ruled that an Alabama statute that
taxed out-of-state insurance companies more heavily than insurers based
in Alabama did not pass the rational basis test.178 The trial court had
determined that the tax furthered at least two purposes in addition to
raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation of new domestic compa-
nies in Alabama; and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign in-
surance companies in Alabama assets and governmental securities.2 79
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court determined that the only actual
purpose of the statute was to favor local business and found this purpose
unacceptable and discriminatory.8 '
273. 470 U.S. 869 (1985). See infra notes 277-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Ward.
274. 472 U.S. 14 (1985). See infra notes 285-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Williams.
275. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
276. Id.
277. 470 U.S. 869.
278. Id. at 882-83.
279. Id. at 873.
280. Id. at 878.
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In a scathing dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the state's tax
was based on "contemporary realities of insurance regulation and taxa-
tion ... [which] justify a uniquely local perspective." '281 She criticized
the majority's analysis, asserting that it had confused the two-step ra-
tional basis test by combining the inquiry regarding the state's purpose
and the inquiry into the relationship of the classification to that purpose
into "a single unarticulated judgment." '282 In conclusion, Justice
O'Connor chastised the Court for ignoring evidence that there was a le-
gitimate local interest which the tax furthered.283 In her opinion, the
majority had by-passed the conventional rational basis test and imposed
"its own economic values on the Equal Protection Clause." '284
The second case, Williams v. Vermont,285 concerned a Vermont stat-
ute which provided that Vermont residents who purchased cars out of
state were exempt from Vermont's use tax to the extent of any sales tax
paid in the state of purchase.286 However, non-residents who purchased
cars out of state, paid the sales tax in the state of purchase, but later
moved to Vermont were required to pay Vermont's use tax upon registra-
tion of their vehicles.287 The plaintiff claimed this exemption was dis-
criminatory because, theoretically, a resident could purchase a car in
another state, remain in that state for a period of time, and still escape
the use tax in Vermont upon his return.288 The Court determined that
no legitimate purpose was furthered by the exemption and that "resi-
dence at the time of purchase [was] a wholly arbitrary basis on which to
distinguish among present Vermont registrants.
' '28 9
Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that the exemption had been
based on the legitimate presumption that people will use their cars pri-
281. Id. at 891 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 884 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
283. Justice O'Connor argued that the tax rationally furthered the legitimate purpose of
promoting local insurance companies. She viewed this goal as in the public interest because
local companies are more inclined to underwrite policies for "the urban poor, small businesses
and family farms" than larger, out-of-state insurance companies. Id. at 891-92 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
284. Id. at 900 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority, according to Justice O'Connor,
had collapsed the two prongs of the rational basis test, legitimate purpose and means rationally
related to that purpose, into one undefined test. She took issue with the majority's unprece-
dented rationale that because the means appeared discriminatory, the purpose could not be
legitimate. Id. at 898-99 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
285. 472 U.S. 14.
286. Id. at 16.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 19.
289. Id. at 23.
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marily in the states in which they reside.29' He asserted that the resi-
dency classification would distinguish those likely to use Vermont's roads
immediately after purchasing cars out of state and credit them if they
had already paid a state tax. According to Justice Blackmun, it was not
unreasonable for the state to deny the same benefit to non-resident pur-
chasers because it was presumed they would use their cars in the state of
purchase. If the non-resident subsequently moved to Vermont, payment
of the Vermont tax over and above the prior tax paid was justified be-
cause he had used the highways of both states as a resident and should
support their maintenance.29'
Justice Blackmun concluded that the statute should be upheld since
it was a rational means of furthering Vermont's legitimate goals of main-
taining state highways and encouraging reciprocal purchases between
states.292 According to Justice Blackmun, the majority had employed a
circular logic in concluding that because the statute discriminated
against the out-of-state residents, it could not further a legitimate pur-
pose.293 He noted that this approach suggested "a new level of scrutiny
that [was] neither minimal nor strict, but strange unto itself."'294 Justice
Blackmun viewed this analysis as a serious departure from the traditional
rational basis test under which a tax classification "does not violate the
demands of equal protection simply because it may not perfectly identify
the class of people."2 95
Both Ward and Williams were tax cases and did not concern a pos-
sibly suspect minority class like Cleburne. However, they did involve
classifications based on out-of-state residency; classifications of which the
Court tends to be more suspicious. 296 These cases are therefore signifi-
cant because in each, as in Cleburne, the Court applied a stricter level of
scrutiny than the traditional rational basis test; in all three cases, the
290. Id. at 33-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
291. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 30-31 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Generally the rationale for a compensating use
tax is to protect local merchants from out-of-state competition. Thus, a purchaser may not
benefit from another state's lower sales tax because any difference between the tax of that state
and his own must be paid in the form of the use tax. Apparently no states charge sales tax to
out-of-state purchasers. Id. at 36 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing J.C. Penney Co. v.
Hardesty, 264 S.E.2d 604, 613 (W. Va. 1980)).
293. Id. at 31-32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[The] statute is placed under a constitutional
cloud because a state court failed to go out of its way to reject a hypothetical interpretation of
one of the statute's terms."); see also supra note 284 and accompanying text.
294. Williams, 472 U.S. at 31 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
295. Id. at 34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
296. See supra second paragraph of note 209 for a discussion of this concept.
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majority demanded a much closer relationship between the legislative
purpose and the means of achieving that purpose.
A more rigorous rational basis test as applied in these cases may be
desirable since the traditional test of Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 297 has
long been recognized as useful in theory but ineffective in application.
Almost any statute may pass constitutional muster when challenged
under the Williamson test. 98 However, what is troubling is that in
Ward, Williams and Cleburne, the Court departed from the traditional
test without explaining the reason for this departure or clearly articulat-
ing criteria for a new test. Thus, it is not surprising that both Justice
O'Connor in Ward29 9 and Justice Marshall in Cleburne30 0 likened the
Court's approach to the days of Lochner v. New York,30° when legislation
could be struck down merel because the Court viewed it as unwise." 2
The concern is not so much with the result of the decisions but with the
Court's use of an approach motivated more by politics and personal judg-
ment than by sound constitutional interpretation.
3. An unclear future
The majority's decision to apply a rational basis test in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center30 3 and the manner in which that test
was applied presents some difficulties for future equal protection cases.
The major concern is, of course, how to determine what criteria should
be used by lower courts in such cases. The Court appears to have
rejected the traditional three-tier approach by refusing to apply an inter-
mediate level scrutiny to the Cleburne ordinance despite the similarity of
the mentally retarded to other groups afforded this level of scrutiny. Yet
the Court's application of a "heightened" rational basis test leaves un-
clear whether the Court is aiming towards a stricter rational basis test to
be applied across the board, or if the test represents a "second order"
rational basis test, applicable only under certain unarticulated cir-
cumstances.
C. The Majority's "'As Applied" Approach
The final issue of concern in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
297. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
299. Ward, 470 U.S. at 899-900 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
300. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3271 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
301. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
302. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
303. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
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Center 3" is the majority's ruling that Cleburne's zoning ordinance was
invalid only as applied.30 5 Rather than affirming the court of appeal's
conclusion that the ordinance was invalid on its face, the Court preferred
a narrower course of adjudication so as to "avoid making unnecessarily
broad constitutional judgments."3 6 Since the Court concluded that the
statute was invalid as applied to CLC, it deemed it unnecessary to decide
whether the City of Cleburne "may never insist on a special use permit
for a home for the mentally retarded" in the zoned area in question.30 7
The majority supported its position by citing Brockett v. Spokane
Arcades, Inc.,308 United States v. Grace30 9 and NAACP v. Button.310
These cases, however, concerned statutes that did not expressly mention
the plaintiff's class but had been applied to them.311 In contrast, the
Cleburne ordinance on its face listed the "feeble-minded" as a group re-
quired to obtain a special use permit.312 The issue in Cleburne concerned
whether this group of "feeble-minded" should be required to obtain a
special use permit, whereas the cases cited by the majority involved is-
sues concerning whether the legislation in question was ever intended to
be applied to the affected class in the first place.
It is interesting that the Court chose to ignore cases more on point
with Cleburne than the ones cited. For instance, in the recent case of
Hunter v. Underwood,31 3 the plaintiff challenged a statute that prevented
convicted criminals from voting. Although the statute was racially neu-
tral on its face, it was held invalid because its original enactment was
motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose.31 4 In Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur,315 the Court held invalid on its face a school board
regulation requiring mandatory leave for any pregnant teacher at least
304. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
305. Id. at 3260.
306. Id. at 3258.
307. Id. (emphasis added).
308. 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
309. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
310. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
311. Brockett addressed whether the definition of "prurient interest" (part of the definition
of obscenity) could encompass "normal, healthy, sexual desires." 472 U.S. at 495. Grace in-
volved a statute that prohibited the display of flags, banners, or other such items and its appli-
cation preventing an individual from distributing leaflets on a public sidewalk. 461 U.S. at
175-76. Lastly, Button concerned a Virginia statute that provided for disciplinary action
against attorneys who improperly solicit business as applied to the NAACP's offer of services
to challenge racial issues. 371 U.S. at 419.
312. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
313. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
314. Id. at 229-30.
315. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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five months before the expected birth.3 16 A primary reason for the
Court's ruling in LaFleur was that the statute did not provide any means
for rebuttal of the presumption that pregnant women cannot work four
or five months after conception.317 Both Hunter and LaFleur stand for
the proposition that when a statute overtly employs an impermissible
classification, the preferred method of adjudication is to hold the statute
invalid on its face."'
The Cleburne ordinance is similar to the statutes in Hunter and La-
Fleur. The statute in Hunter was held facially invalid primarily because
its legislative history indicated that the statute's original objective was to
prevent blacks from voting and was thus prejudicial in nature.319 Simi-
larly, evidence suggests that the Cleburne zoning ordinance was also
originally enacted for discriminatory reasons.320 Moreover, like the stat-
ute in LaFleur, the Cleburne ordinance provided no standards by which
to determine when application of the permit requirement would be valid
or to rebut the presumed need for a special permit.321 On the basis of
316. Id.
317. Id. at 644-45. "[Ihe ability of any particular pregnant woman to continue at work
past any fixed time in her pregnancy is very much an individual matter." Id. at 645.
318. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3274 & n.25 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
319. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 231-33.
320. The term "feeble-minded," used in the language of the Cleburne ordinance, is strongly
reminiscent of a time when segregation and prejudice against the mentally retarded was at its
highest point. See supra note 180. The amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of CLC by the
American Association on Mental Deficiency, the Association for Persons with Severe Handi-
caps, American Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Or-
thopsychiatric Association, American Association of University Affiliated Programs for the
Developmentally Disabled, and The Council for Exceptional Children, states that terms such
as "feeble-minded," "fools," "morons," "imbeciles," and "idiots" are stigmatizing and
archaic. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 5 n.8, Clebure Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 735 F.2d
832 (5th Cir. 1984) (No. 84-468), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984), aff'd in part, vacated in
part, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. Futher, amicus curiae argued that
such labels are "uniquely 'odious and ... invidious."' Id. at 5 n.3 (citing A. STONE, MENTAL
HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 119 (1975)). Recognized authorities in the
field of mental deficiency have discredited such terms. Id. (citing Information for Authors, 89
AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCY 109 (1984); THE ASSOCIATION FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE
HANDICAPS, GUIDELINES FOR REPORTING AND WRITING ABOUT PEOPLE WITH DISABILI-
TIES (1984)).
In Cleburne, Justice Marshall noted that the City's ordinance itself appeared to have
descended from other zoning ordinances dating back to 1929. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3268
n.17 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Clebure City's Act of
September 26, 1947 and § 4 of Dallas Ordinance No. 2052, passed September 11, 1929). The
time of the enactment and the terminology used suggest that the Cleburne ordinance was
originally founded on prejudice towards the retarded. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3268 n.17 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
321. The CLC home was intended to house "mildly" retarded adults. Since the majority of
mentally retarded individuals fall into this category, the Court's ruling would likely make the
April 1987] CITY OF CLEBURNE
these decisions, and the Court's own conclusion that the statute, as ap-
plied, rests on "irrational prejudice" against the mentally retarded, the
Court reasonably could have required the City to redraft the ordinance in
a more precise manner.322 Or, the Court could have at least indicated
when the City would be justified in requiring the permit.
The likely explanation for the Court's refusal to repeat the result of
Hunter and LaFleur in Cleburne is that Hunter and LaFleur each con-
cerned race or gender classifications which the Court had previously de-
termined suspect and quasi-suspect, respectively.323 In Cleburne,
however, the Court flatly refused to recognize the mentally retarded as a
quasi-suspect class. This distinction may explain the Court's unwilling-
ness to facially invalidate Cleburne's ordinance.
When a statute is held invalid on its face, the state may respond in
one of two ways: (1) legislatively, by enacting a new law cured of the old
law's impermissible defects; or (2) judicially, by construing the statute as
being limited in scope only to a defined permissible application. Both
responses, however, require the state to "correct" the statute.324
Cleburne ordinance invalid as applied to almost 90% of the retarded population. See supra
note 118 and accompanying text. As Justice Marshall noted, a statute which would be invalid
in most situations is clearly overbroad. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3273 (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
322. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3260. See infra note 324.
323. Hunter, 471 U.S. 222, also concerned the right to vote which, as a "fundamental"
right, triggers strict scrutiny. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
324. See J. ELY, supra note 41, at 106. Dean Ely has suggested that where the political
power of a minority group has increased, the Court should employ a "second-look" approach
to laws passed before the increase in power occurred. For instance, with respect to women,
who cannot be said to be a minority and for whom access to the political process is no longer
blocked, Ely has proposed remanding suspect legislation for this "second-look" by the legisla-
ture. If the law passes a second time, there is less rdason to suspect discriminatory intent. Ely
has noted, however, that "[i]n cases of first-degree prejudice, or self-serving stereotyping"
where a disadvantaged group still is denied access, this second-look approach is unwise; "we
don't give a case back to a rigged jury." Id.
Clearly, the Cleburne ordinance is a product of a time when prejudice against mentally
retarded persons was extreme. See supra note 320. Since the Court concluded that the men-
tally retarded no longer lack political power nor is there continued antipathy toward this
group by legislators, see supra text accompanying notes 119-23, it seems that at minimum a
second legislative evaluation of the ordinance would be appropriate. The better approach
would have been to strike the ordinance down as invalid on its face and force the legislature to
reconsider. However, it may be that this case is one with the "rigged jury" referred to by Dean
Ely.
If the Cleburne ordinance had been found facially invalid, a possible approach for the City
would be the one suggested by Jo Ann Chandler and Sterling Ross, Jr. See Chandler & Ross,
Zoning Restrictions and the Right to Live in the Community, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE
ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE MENTALLY RETARDED CITIZEN AND THE LAW 324
(1976). Chandler and Ross stress the importance of establishing residential group homes for
the mentally retarded and suggest means by which legislators may enact zoning restrictions
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In contrast, when the Court, as in Cleburne, determines that the law
is merely invalid as applied, the state is free to continue using the statute
as written. State courts then must determine on a case-by-case basis
whether the application in question is permissible or not. Consequently,
the chance of further unconstitutional application is great, particularly
where, as here, the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated its reason-
ing or provided clear guidance as to intended application.
Although the Court's decision to only invalidate the ordinance as
applied furthers the Court's goal of narrow constitutional rulings, it acts
almost as a non-ruling. First, the Court's failure to indicate under what
that do not discriminate against mentally retarded persons. They identify components neces-
sary for such legislation as follows:
1. A brief declaration of the need for normalizing the lives of mentally handicapped
persons.
2. A description of how integration in residential zones meets this need.
3. A statement emphasizing that uniform integration can occur only through state-
wide legislation and that, therefore, the matter is one of statewide concern. (The
relevant constitutional provisions and preemption cases of the appropriate jurisdic-
tion should be consulted for suggested language.)
4. A provision making the statute expressly applicable to charter cities. (The home
rule provisions of the state constitution should be consulted.)
5. The requirement that the foster home be a permitted use in all residential zones,
including, but not limited to, single-family zones.
6. A grant of authority to the local entity to impose reasonable conditions on the
use.
7. The type of home referred to in the statute, including the number of residents
served and the range of handicaps which they possess, should be based on the licens-
ing classification of small-group homes in the particular jurisdiction.
Id. at 336. Furthermore, Chandler and Ross suggest the following as a model nondiscrimina-
tory zoning ordinance:
Section - Legislative Intent
(a) It is the policy of this state that mentally and physically handicapped per-
sons are entitled to share with nonhandicapped individuals the benefits of normal
residential surroundings and should not be excluded therefrom because of their disa-
bility.
(b) Pursuant to this policy it is the intent of the legislature that county and
municipal zoning ordinances, and administrative interpretations thereof, should not
deny the handicapped person the exercise of this right.
Section
(a) In order to achieve statewide implementation of the policy and legislative
intent expressed in sections -, a state-authorized or -licensed family care home,
foster home, or group home serving six (6) or fewer mentally retarded or otherwise
handicapped persons shall be considered a residential use of property for the purpose
of zoning and a permitted use in all residential zones including, but not limited to,
single-family residential zones.
(b) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit any city or county
from imposing reasonable conditions on such use consistent with the policy and in-
tent of section - and necessary to protect the health and safety of the residents.
(c) The provisions of sections - and - shall apply to charter cities.
Id. at 337 (footnote omitted). Although CLC had proposed that the home house 13 individu-
als, and the above statute only allows housing up to 6, the statute could clearly be adapted to
accommodate the CLC home.
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circumstances application of the ordinance would be valid leaves both
the Texas legislature and potentially affected groups unsure as to future
standards of application. Second, because the Court allowed a zoning
ordinance that may be rooted in prejudice to remain on the books, future
groups of mentally retarded persons will be forced to go to court to test
this standardless ordinance. The result will be needless future litigation
by mentally retarded groups as well as inefficient use of the judiciary.
V. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL
The Supreme Court's decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center325 leaves several unanswered questions. First, the Court's deter-
mination that the mentally retarded are not a quasi-suspect class is not
only inconsistent with prior equal protection cases, but may threaten the
future security of groups which have been granted greater judicial protec-
tion. Second, the Court's application of a "heightened" rational basis
test leaves an unclear distinction as to whether lower courts are to apply
a "second order" rational basis test only in certain cases, or whether the
rational basis test has been tightened up overall. Lastly, the Court leaves
a confusing precedent by striking only as applied an ordinance which had
all of the characteristics of a law that should be held facially invalid.
Interestingly, many of the Justices did not completely agree with the
reasoning set out in Justice White's majority opinion. Justice Stevens,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, concurred in the majority's result, but
advocated a single rational basis test.326 Justice Marshall, along with
Justices Brennan and Blackmun adamantly disagreed with the majority's
analysis, arguing that a "sliding scale" approach was preferable to the
application of three-tiered equal protection analysis. 327 Five justices,
therefore, expressed some dissatisfaction with the Cleburne majority's
analysis, and all of the justices appeared at least somewhat dissatisfied
with the three-tiered approach. Thus, the Cleburne case dramatically il-
lustrates that the Court must reevaluate its method of equal protection
analysis rather than distorting the three-tiered approach to such a degree
that lower courts are left in complete confusion.
A. A Suggested Approach
One possible alternative to the Cleburne Court's approach is the sin-
325. 105 S. Ct 3249 (1985).
326. Id. at 3260-61 (Stevens, J., concurring).
327. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3266 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see supra note 87 and accorApanying text.
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gle rational basis test advocated by Justice Stevens. 2 8 This approach
would require a court to examine significant factors such as the possibil-
ity that the burdened class has suffered a tradition of disfavor, the public
purpose being served by the law and the existence of characteristics of
the burdened class that may justify special treatment.329 Suggesting that
an examination of these factors would lead a court to determine if a law
is rational or not, Justice Stevens urged that this approach would "result
in the virtually automatic invalidation of racial classifications and in the
validation of most economic classifications. ' 330 But Justice Stevens also
noted that "differing results" would occur where classifications are based
on alienage, gender, or illegitimacy.
331
The difficulty with Justice Stevens' approach is that it does not
clearly indicate how a court is to know what is "rational" or not, particu-
larly in cases where the group's characteristics are, in some instances,
relevant to the state's interests. Granted, the three-tiered analysis may be
too rigid because it attempts to pigeon-hole cases which involve various
factors. However, Justice Stevens' approach is, perhaps, too broad be-
cause it allows for very subjective judicial review by justices who are ex-
pected to somehow know or feel that a law is irrational under the
circumstances. Certainly, terms of art common to the three-tiered ap-
proach, such as "substantially related," "compelling interest," and "ra-
tional basis," all suffer from some subjective inconsistencies, but with
careful definition by the court using them, they can give some guidance
in later application. Thus, Justice Stevens' single rational basis test may
make the Court's determinations even more subjective and vague than
they are under the present test.332
Justice Marshall's approach, like Justice Stevens' approach, would
also require a case-by-case analysis of relevant factors. He has suggested
that a court examine the importance of the interest affected and the in-
328. See supra text accompanying notes 133-43.
329. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3261-62 (1985) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
330. Id. at 3262 (Stevens, J., concurring).
331. Id.
332. In reality, the Court's analysis in Cleburne closely resembles Justice Stevens' ap-
proach. The result is an ad hoc but undefined approach to equal protection analysis. Professor
Christopher May of Loyola Law School, Los Angeles has referred to this approach as a "black
box" approach, whereby the Court, in a sense, places all the factors involved into a black box
where no one but the Court can "see" how its decision is made. Then, miraculously, out
comes the result and the Court's determination of whether the classification in question is
"rational" or not! Even where the result favors the challenging party, the Court's refusal to
allow others to "see" what process of analysis goes on in the black box further confuses an
already unclear standard.
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vidiousness of the basis on which a classification is drawn to determine
the degree of scrutiny to be applied.333 Where a fundamental constitu-
tional right is affected and the basis cf the classification is race, the
court's scrutiny would be high. Where a right of less importance, such as
education, is affected and the basis of the law is less invidious, such as
classification of undocumented alien children, 34 the level of scrutiny
would decrease accordingly. Justice Marshall's approach, therefore, falls
between Justice Stevens' extremely subjective test and the rigid pigeon-
holing of the three-tiered analysis.
This "sliding scale" analysis335 suggested by Justice Marshall is per-
haps the most workable standard for two reasons. First, because many
groups do not easily fit into one of the three tiers, courts need a flexible
test that can accommodate the various factors involved in each case. The
Court has essentially treated the test as flexible in cases like Cleburne, but
when it does so under the pretense that only three tiers exist, the credibil-
ity of its decisions is threatened and lower courts are left with confusing
precedent. Justice Marshall's approach would allow the Court the flexi-
bility to tailor its equal protection analysis to the specific facts of a case,
without imposing the limitations of only three tiers. Secondly, unlike
Justice Stevens' or Justice White's approaches, the Court would be re-
quired to justify its reasons for applying a stronger or weaker level of
scrutiny. Although each case would still be decided on an ad hoe basis,
the factors which had been analyzed and balanced would at least be iden-
tified. The Court would not be able to simply determine that a law ap-
peared rational or irrational, but would have to identify where the case fit
on the "scale" and why.
It is difficult to predict future application of the test applied in
Cleburne, particularly because of the disparity of opinions. The one issue
on which all the members of the Court agreed was that the special use
permit requirement for the CLC home was invalid as applied because it
was based on irrational prejudice. Future cases involving the mentally
retarded may be able to draw from Cleburne a precedent calling for a
more "heightened" rational basis test. Possibly, future equal protection
cases concerning minorities similarly situated to the mentally retarded
may also receive some sort of "heightened scrutiny," although it is not
clear what the Court will call this level of scrutiny.33 6
333. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3265 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted). See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
334. See Plyler v. Doe discussed supra at text accompanying notes 79-81.
335. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 254-75.
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Another possibility is that a tougher rational basis test will be ap-
plied across the board.337 However, a major goal of this Note has been to
point out that the Court's application of a rational basis test in Cleburne
could just as easily signal a trend toward limiting close judicial scrutiny
of legislation affecting groups presently afforded suspect or quasi-suspect
status. 338 The Court's failure to either clearly articulate its reasoning or
the criteria it now considers relevant to its conclusions makes it difficult
to confidently interpret the future impact of this case.
The lesson of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center33 9 is that
result-oriented decisions often make bad law. The Court can no longer
continue merely to manipulate its analysis under the equal protection
clause to achieve desired results without articulating analytical reasoning
that can reasonably be applied by lower courts. The risk of continuing
this action is that decisions will be misapplied and the credibility of the
United States Supreme Court will be damaged. The Court must reevalu-
ate its approach to equal protection analysis and adopt a flexible and
workable standard that can accommodate those who come to the courts
to invoke the equal protection of the laws.
Ellen E. Halfon
337. See supra text accompanying notes 276-302.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 237-40.
339. 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
